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THESIS ABSTRACT 
This study undertakes an historical analysis of the socio-political development of indigt.::nous 
peoples in Russia, with the intent of producing a theory which explains both the why and how of 
indigenous ethnic mobilization. It is argued that Soviet nationalities policy was key in 
promoting indigenous ethnic identities and in laying the foundations for their subsequent ethnic 
mobilization. State policies have influenced the way indigenous peoples think about their ethnic 
identities, the political goals they pursue, and the political strategies they employ in furthering 
group interests. By employing the ethnic mobilization perspective, this study argues that it 
structural change-- not a backlash to collective oppression nor a primordial sentiment reactivated 
in a modem context-- that caused indigenous ethnic mobilization within Russia. One of the most 
revealing findings of this study is that those variables that are responsible for the initiation of 
ethnic mobilization are not necessarily the same as those responsible for the success of ethnic 
movements. Structural change that reorganizes ethnic competition may initiate ethnic 
movements, while success hinges on yet a different outcome of structural change-- the 
generation of opposition to the political center which extends across the different classes that 
comprise the ethnic group. 
This study makes three contributions to the scholarship on ethnic mobilization: 
Theoretically, it advances a broader explanation of the causes and outcomes of ethnic 
mobilization so as to also incorporate indigenous peoples. At present, such a theoretical account 
does not exist and is urgently needed. Methodologically, it draws on the different possible 
theoretical approaches to understanding ethnic mobilization and extends the ethnic sub-
nationalism model to explain both how and why Russia's indigenes have mobilized along ethnic 
lines. This study represents an original contribution in extending studies of ethnic mobilization 
Ill 
to the indigenous Fourth World and, as a result, holds the promise of meaningfully contributing 
to our understanding of ethnic political mobilization. Substantively, this study offers an analysis 
of indigenous efforts towards greater self-determination in Russia, with specific attention to the 
case of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia). The evidence upon which this thesis is based is the 
historical record-- primary and secondary sources-- as well as interviews conducted with local 
native experts, political elites, and "ordinary" community members in the Sakha Republic 
(Yakutia), with respect to the challenges currently faced by indigenous peoples and initiatives 
toward their solution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Overview of tbe Study 
The Gorbachev leadership introduced multiple reforms which changed the face of the Soviet 
Union forever. The nationalities explosion of that period was largely due to the state's sudden 
tolerance for, and recognition of, ethnicity as a legitimate basis for political organization and 
representation. Since that time, both the number of groups engaged in, and the intensity of, 
ethnic mobilization seems to have grown steadily within the former Soviet Union. Even the 
smallest ethnic minorities have mobilized to protect their collective interests. 
Ethnic mobilization is the "process by which a group organizes along ethnic lines in 
pursuit of group ends." 1 This occurs whenever a group employs ethnicity as the basis for 
political action and/ or organization. Ethnic mobilization manifests itself in various ways: 
nationalist and/ or secessionist movements; mass political violence over ethnic grievances; and 
formation of, and electoral support for, ethnic political parties, to name but a few. Ethnic 
mobilization, however, does not always involve such actions. Since the form of ethnic 
mobilization is connected to the goals the ethnic group is pursuing, ethnic groups who do not 
seek to challenge or threaten the political center are unlikely to employ the political actions 
mentioned above. 
Groups may act politically according to ethnic cleavages in yet other ways such as the 
formation of, and participation in, ethnic associations. Indigenous peoples within Russia have 
done this at various levels-- local, regional (both raion and republic), and nationwide. In 1990, 
indigenous representatives from throughout Russia founded an aboriginal organization at the 
nationwide level which would have strong contacts with, and draw its constituency from, parallel 
organizations at both regional and local levels. Indigenous peoples promote their interests 
through yet other organizations, though some are exclusive to a particular occupational group 
2 
(i .e. Union ofReindeer Herders ofYakutia), ones' role in society (i.e. Council of Elders ofthe 
Yukagir People), or gender (i.e. the indigeno~W'omen's association Abori en~a). As people 
come to realize that they have the capacity to affect decisions that impact upon their lives, the 
level of participation in ethnic associations is likely to increase. This has, to some extent, 
already started to change since the introduction of Gorbachev' s reforms. 
Indigenous peoples have also promoted their collective interests through peaceful 
demonstrations against certain developments which they perceive as threats. The Nem:ts, for 
instance, peacefully protested against oil and gas development on the Yamal Peninsula. While 
protests are one way to secure media coverage of indigenous issues, this may also be achieved 
via letter-writing campaigns, press releases, and conferences. The support offered by indigenous 
associations and state departments has bolstered such efforts. Conferences not only permit 
exchanges of ideas that may foster indigenous development but, like the publication of scholarly 
works on indigenous issues, further the native movement by attracting attention to indigenous 
interests. So too have indigenous groups sought influence by establishing working relations 
with, and applying pressure tactics upon, policy makers and officials at different levels within 
Russia. 
Manifestations of ethnic mobilization may also occur at the international level. In the 
case of Russia's indigenous population, group leaders formed linkages with various non-
governmental (i.e. Inuit Circumpolar Conference) and international organizations (i.e. United 
Nations, International Labor Organization) through which they have sought to promote group 
interests. 
This thesis attempts to achieve an explanation of why and how ethnic mobilization is 
occurring among Russia's indigenous peoples. This topic is worthy of study as it challenges 
previously-held assumptions that ethnic integration, once achieved, is permanent2 and that older 
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foundations of political association (i.e. ethnicity) are on the decline.3 It also debunks the myth 
that the policy dimension has little bearing on the basic causes or nature of ethno-territorial 
movements.4 This thesis argues to the contrary: State responses to indigenous peoples, as 
couched in Soviet nationalities policy, were key in promoting indigenous ethnic identities and in 
laying the foundations for their subsequent ethnic mobilization. These policies also helped to 
shape the very strategy indigenous peoples employ in furthering group interests. These are, by 
far, the most significant implications of Soviet policy for indigenous peoples. 
The case study employed in this thesis is geographically limited to the Sakha Republic in 
Siberia and concerns the indigenous peoples of this republic. 5 As this thesis shall demonstrate, 
the causal inferences behind ethnic mobilization somewhat differ between indigenous and other 
ethnic groups; consequently, theorists need to pay attention to those factors which distinguish the . 
indigenous fourth world6 from so-called underdeveloped regions of the first, second, and third 
worlds. 7 Indeed, while different regions and peoples may be affected by similar macro-processes, 
the contextual processes may differ. This study highlights the need to recognize the diversity of 
sub-nations within the social sciences. 8 The case of Yakutia offers insights into a region whose 
experience vis-a-vis indigenous peoples is distinctive due both to the cultural distinctiveness of 
the region and to the closed nature of Soviet society which prevailed until recently. 
The Sakha Republic is an ideal case study as it "is pivotal in setting an example for other 
ethnically defined areas in Siberia and the Far East."9 This is true in many respects, the most 
pertinent to this study being devolution and the new forms of land tenure achieved by Yakutia' s 
indigenous peoples. Although Russia's center has traditionally considered Yakutia to be 
peripheral, this republic is not only an important region for trade and transportation within 
Asiatic Russia, but has become paramount to the continued existence of the Russian Federation 
itself Russia's national economy is based primarily on the development of resources found in 
4 
its northern regions and, particularly, in Yakutia. The position of strength in which Yakutia 
currently finds itself vis-a-vis Moscow, as this thesis will show, is relevant to indigenous 
development within the region. Soviet models of development are quickly eroding and, with 
these, so are many of the factors which furthered regional development and offered protection 
for aboriginal lands and resources. This transition highlights the need for some degree of 
responsibility for, and accountability to, local indigenous peoples, as well as returning us to 
some basic questions of political theory concerning legitimacy, representation, and social 
responsibility. 
The term "indigenous peoples", for the purposes of this thesis, refers to the Numerically 
Small Peoples of the Russian North 10 as an entity separate and apart from other distinctive 
groups such as the Komi, Buryat or Sakha (Yakut). Each of Russia's 26 state-recognized 
indigenous groups numbers less than 50,000 persons (see Map 1.1 and Table 1.1 ). 11 These non-
state or tribal peoples traditionally exhibit( ed) egalitarian, kin-based socio-political organization 
and non-industrial economies based on subsistence and reciprocity. This study does not consider 
groups such as the Sakha as "indigenous" for their socio-political organization was hierarchical 
and their economies were based on centralized redistribution at the time of European expansion 
into Siberia. 12 Another reason for this distinction, however, is that while each indigenous group 
recognizes each other to be indigenous, these peoples themselves do not recognize the Sakha, 
Buryat or Komi as such. 13 Here, the concept of ethnic boundaries is crucial: it is this set of 
markers which determines group perceptions of who belongs to an ethnic grouping, and 
ultimately who, by very nature of cultural differences, can never belong. 14 
Yakutia's natives include the Evenks, Evens, Yukagirs, Dolgans, and Chukchi. 
Linguistically, the Evenks and Evens are of the Tungus-Manchu family, the Dolgans are of the 
Turkic family, and the Yukagirs and Chukchi are of the Paleoasiatic grouping oflittle internal 
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Table 1.1 Population of Aboriginal Peoples of Russia, 1926-1989 
Nationali 
Nenets 
Evenks 
KhalltS 
Evens 
Chukchi 
Nanai 
Koriaks 
Mansi 
Do/gallS 
Nivkhi 
Sel'kups 
Ul'chi 
/tel'mellS 
Udegey 
Saami 
&kimos 
Chuvans 
Nganasans 
Yukagirs 
Kets 
Orochi 
Tofalars 
Aleuts 
Negidals 
Enets 
Oroks 
1926 
16,217 
38,805 
17,334 
2,044 
12,221 
5,860 
7,439 
6,095 
656 
4,076 
1,630 
723 
859 
1,357 
na 
1,293 
705 
867 
443 
1,428 
647 
413 
353 
683 
482 
162 
':AlYu~Q{~~-·1';~'.j8;',: 
~·kT~d~g~~1~~:;r"fi1H;~'"'+:f;@f~~~tfru• ::~f:; 
1959 
23,007 
24,710 
19,410 
9,124 
11,727 
8,026 
6,287 
6,449 
na 
3,717 
3,768 
2,055 
1,109 
1,444 
na 
1,118 
na 
748 
442 
1,019 
782 
586 
421 
na 
na 
na 
/970 1979 
28,487 29,487 
25,051 27,041 
21,007 20,743 
11,819 12,452 
13,500 13,937 
9,911 10,357 
7,367 7,637 
7,609 7,434 
4,718 4,911 
4,356 4,366 
4,249 3,518 
2,410 2,494 
1,255 1,335 
1,396 1,431 
1,836 1,775 
1,265 1,460 
na na 
823 842 
593 801 
I, 161 1,072 
1,037 1,040 
570 576 
410 489 
495 477 
na na 
na na 
6 
1989 
34,190 
29,975 
22,283 
17,055 
15,106 
11 ,877 
8,9423 
8,266 
6,571 
4,631 
3,564 
3,173 
2,428 
1,902b 
1,835 
1,703 
1,384 
1,262 
1, 112 
1,084 
883c 
722 
644 
587 
198 
391d 
Sources: Statistics 011 the Economic and Cultural Development of the Northern Aboriginal People of the USSR (For 
the period /980-/989) (Ottawa: Government of Canada, Dept of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1991), 
5; Gail Fondahl, "Siberia: Natives and Newcomers in Collision," in Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor 
States, eds. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 486; Vladimir Leksin and 
Yelena Andreyeva, "The Small Peoples of the North: Ethnic Relations and Prospects for Survival Under New 
Conditions," PolarGeographyandGeology, 19, no. 1(1995): 43-57. 
Note: The abbreviation "na" generally means that this information was not collected in the censuses. However, in the 
case of the Saami, I was unable to locate population statistics for the years 1929 and 1959. The shaded area indicates 
those peoples not designated in the population census of 1989. All other figures are based on census data. 
a In this 1989 census figure, the Alyutors and Kereks were included as Koriaks. This was undoubtedly the case for all 
censuses preceding this as well. The figure cited here includes the 2100 person miscount 
b The Taz were included among the Udegey in the census of 1989. 
c The census of 1989 erroneously recorded 883 Orochi, but this included 212 inhabitants of Sakhalin who by 
nationality are Oroks. This was undoubtedly also the case for the 1959, 1970 and 1979 censuses, during which years 
the Oroks were removed from the nationalities listed in the census [Leksin and Andreyeva, "The Small Peoples of the 
North": 47]. 
d The census of 1989 registered 179 Oroks, erroneously not including the 212 persons mentioned above. This was 
undoubtedly also the case for the 1959, 1970 and 1979 censuses for the reason mentioned above. 
• In census materials included among the Koriaks [Leksin and Andreyeva,"The Small Peoples of the North": 47). 
r In census materials included among the Udegey [Leksin and Andreyeva, "The Small Peoples of the North": 4 7]. 
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coherence. The Evenks, who inhabit southern and western Yakutia, numbered 29,957 nationally 
in 1989 (10,293 in Yakutia), the Evens 17,055 (5974), the Yukagirs 1112 (534), the Chukchi 
15,106 (360), and the Dolgans 6571 (362) respectively. 15 The Evens, Yukagirs and Chukchi 
inhabit the north-eastern, and Dolgans the north-western regions of Yakutia. 
This thesis is arranged chronologically, examining developments throughout the entire 
Soviet period and extending into the era of post-Soviet transition in order to trace variations in 
ethnic identities, loyalties, and movements over time. It explores the nature of ethnic boundaries 
and shifts in the dynamics of ethnic group formation and maintenance among Russia's natives. 
As this thesis will show, a key consequence of Soviet nationalities policy for these peoples is the 
re-discovered capacity to re-define and maintain their own ethnic boundaries. 
Chapter One introduces the theoretical and methodological problems which concern this 
investigation. It explores some of the ideas put forward in, and limitations of, the scholarship on 
ethnicity, ethnic mobilization, and indigenous development. It outlines four main theoretical 
perspectives on ethnic mobilization-- developmental, reactive ethnicity, ethnic competition, and 
ethnic sub-nationalism-- and considers the usefulness of each to understanding ethnic 
mobilization as it has occurred among Russia's indigenous population. While the ethnic sub-
nationalism model is of greater utility than the other three in these regards, it cannot sufficiently 
explain indigenous mobilization within Russia. I argue that an understanding of indigenous 
mobilization may be achieved by extending the ethnic sub-nationalism model and suggest ways 
in which this may be done. This chapter finally explains the methodology employed in this 
investigation. 
Chapter Two reviews the Soviet period prior to Gorbachev's ascendancy. It traces 
modem state-building processes, the rise of national politics, the expansion of the political 
sphere and the centralization of bureaucratic control. Although this era represents the age of 
8 
subordination for indigenous peoples, it gave rise to the multifarious state agencies that would 
foster indigenous identities. The state simultaneously promoted assimilationist (integrationist) 
and segregationist measures. The consequent failure to fully incorporate aboriginal peoples into 
Soviet society promoted their unique path of political development. The subordination of 
indigenous concerns to Soviet state-building designs and the superimposition of ethnic 
boundaries of the state's design upon those traditionally recognized by natives represented 
discontinuities in terms of both their political organization and their control over their ethnic 
boundaries. Chapter Two shows both that the Soviet government treated indigenous peoples 
differently than other groups in many respects and that other state policies, though applied 
uniformly to ethnic groups throughout the Soviet Union, had unique consequences for 
indigenous political development. 
Chapter Three examines those macro-level (exogenous) developments which contributed 
to indigenous ethnic mobilization during and after the Gorbachev era. These include state 
policies imposed "from above", support from external sources, and macro-political processes. 
While the Soviet period introduced many of the structural requisites for indigenous mobilization, 
the Gorbachev period introduced the necessary political conditions. The level of political 
competition between ethnic groups was also heightened during this period. Certain exogenous 
influences shaped the opportunity structure16 for mobilization differently, thus contributing to 
varying degrees of success of ethnic mobilization among different indigenous groups throughout 
Russia. 
Chapter Four examines those micro-level (endogenous) developments which contributed 
to indigenous mobilization during and after the Gorbachev era, with specific attention to the 
implications of Soviet nationalities policy for indigenous ethnic identities, socio-political 
organization, and strategy. A state of flux characterized this period, with aboriginal peoples 
9 
gaining some leverage vis-a-vis the state in terms of the re-definition and maintenance of their 
own ethnic boundaries. 17 This has involved the assertion of native ethnic identities, and the 
expansion of ethnic boundaries to incorporate multiple, overlapping, and situational identities. 
The ethnic mobilization of Russia's natives is distinguished from that of other groups with 
respect to indigenous notions of identity, as well as their political goals, resources, and 
strategies. 
Chapter Five explains how endogenous and exogenous influences affect both the 
initiation and the success of indigenous mobilization. This chapter explores the applicability 
and limitations of the four existing perspectives on ethnic mobilization and expands upon the 
model which is best suited to the realities of the case study-- the ethnic sub-nationalism model--
in order to broaden the applicability of the ethnic sub-nationalism model to also incorporate 
indigenous populations. On a final note, chapter five demarcates the contributions of this study 
to the scholarship on, and study of, ethnic mobilization and proposes several areas for further 
study. 
This study concludes with a summary of the key arguments outlined in, and lessons 
learned from, this study and a few words on the future of aboriginal development in post-Soviet 
Russia. In doing so, it draws a final linkage between Soviet nationalities policy, indigenous 
ethno-political mobilization and ethnic boundary maintenance. 
10 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Problems for Investigation and Methodology 
One of the greatest ironies of the twentieth century is the resurgence of ethnic sentiment and 
nationalism within the Soviet Union despite official claims to have "solved" the "nationalities 
question". While ethnic sentiments may have prompted the Gorbachev leadership to introduce 
glasnost ' (openness) and other reformist measures, these changes, in turn permitted new 
contenders within the political system, as one ethnic group after another entered into competition 
for political rewards and benefits. Even the country's northern minorities have organized to 
protect their collective interests (refer to Appendix 1 for a chronology of significant events and 
documents regarding indigenous ethno-political mobilization in Yakutia). 
Much Soviet scholarly work focuses on the Soviet government's special treatment of 
indigenous peoples; 1 however, the implications of this treatment for indigenous social, cultural, 
economic and political development demand further analysis. What are the consequences of the 
legacy of Soviet nationalities policy for indigenous peoples during this current period of post-
Soviet transition? What factors and processes permitted indigenous mobilization within Soviet 
Russia to occur and what shape has it taken? Are these the same influences which determine the 
success of such an ethnic movement? Are the factors which influence indigenous ethnic 
mobilization any different than those that influence other ethnic groups and, if so, how? 
This thesis argues that although the Soviet state held a profound capacity for affecting the 
lives of indigenous peoples, it did not succeed in fully incorporating these peoples into Soviet 
society. State policies and actions were not only ineffective in wholly assimilating indigenous 
peoples, but actually set the stage for their emergent ethnicity and impending ethno-political 
mobilization. These outcomes are by far the most important consequences of Soviet 
nationalities policy for Russia's indigenes. Indigenous ethnic mobilization is multi-tiered and is 
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rooted to a large degree in the consequences of Soviet nationalities policy. Affecting almost 
every facet of indigenous life, state policy forged new ethnic identiti.es from among myriad 
small-scale tribal identities, the effects of which have extended beyond the life of the Soviet 
Union to influence ethnic developments among Russia's natives in the post-Soviet era. 
This chapter concerns the theoretical and methodological bases of this study. It first 
examines the theoretical shortcomings of the scholarship on aboriginal development. It then 
outlines four current perspectives on ethnic mobilization. The chapter proceeds by suggesting 
areas in which an extension of the ethnic sub-nationalism model may be useful to an analysis of 
indigenous ethnic mobilization. The final section discusses the methodology this study employs. 
Theoretical Challenges Regarding the Study of Ethnic Mobilization 
As the state of scholarship on indigenous peoples both contributes to, and reflects, the 
development of indigenous communities, it is essential to approach these peoples from a 
perspective which will contribute in some significant way to the existing scholarship. This thesis 
employs an ethnic mobilization perspective. There have been several theoretical problems for 
the study of indigenous ethno-political mobilization in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. First, the 
inordinate emphasis on the state in both Western and Soviet works on Soviet ethnic relations 
meant that the primary areas of scholarly focus surrounded elite politics and macro-analyses of 
social, economic, and political phenomena. 2 Second, Soviet scholarly works generally paid little 
attention to the wider socio-political linkages within society and avoided issues that the state 
deemed controversial. 3 These problems were largely rooted in the repressive, closed nature of 
Soviet society and have inhibited the study of indigenous peoples since not only did empirical 
materials and analyses of day to day life contradict statements made "from above" by state 
officials, but these problems also obscured ethnic processes (i.e. integration, disintegration) as 
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they involved indigenous populations. Through use of micro-level approaches and an inclusion 
of the "perspective from below'.4, we may achieve a greater understanding of struggles for self-
determination since the focus rests not at the state-level but with indigenous communities 
themselves.5 The changes that occurred in the former Soviet Union permit this today. 
The third problem is that ethnicity- and nationality-related studies generally centered on 
only a few of the Soviet Union's more populous groups6 and have generally not addressed 
Russia's smallest, most peripheral groups means that indigenous peoples were largely 
overlooked within the literature.7 The lack of work produced by native scholars exacerbates the 
problem.8 While the key problem for Western scholars was accessing regions inhabited by 
indigenous peoples, for Soviet scholars it was that the study of ethnicity was severely 
constrained in its parameters and was consequently ignored. Instead, studies of the politics of 
ethnicity were limited to material culture. That Western scholars did not draw upon their own 
frames of reference (i .e. de-colonization, the American indigenous movement) in studies of 
Russia's natives during the pre-Gorbachev era is understandable given that the ethno-political 
mobilization of indigenous peoples had yet to commence. These comparative references, 
coupled with the general ethnic literature, may further our understanding of indigenous 
mobilization within Russia. 
Scholarly works should be capable of identifying general ethnicity-related issues and 
analyzing them in differing regional and cultural contexts,9 yet studies have generally paid 
insufficient attention to the sociological and cultural foundations of the current struggle of 
Russia's indigenous peoples. 10 Scholarship on native peoples should acknowledge that they 
have their own historically-conditioned logic and unique path of political development and that 
they, like more numerous peoples, constitute a community in search of greater autonomy. 11 
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Some of the confusion surrounding the study of native self-determination stems from 
contradictions rooted in the literature on ethnicity and "ethnic mobilization". I define ethnicity, 
for the purposes of this thesis, in terms of ethnic boundaries or ethnic markers, which are usually 
ascribed characteristics. Barth viewed ethnicity both as an antecedent and a consequence of 
particular socio-political processes. 12 As a variably- and situationally-defined construct, 
ethnicity is less a primordial quality reactivated in a modem context13 than the result of ethnic 
boundary maintenance processes. The social construction and maintenance of boundaries and 
identities is dynamic and suggests that ethnicity is not likely to dissolve over time. 14 
Ethnic mobilization is not an inevitable product of ethnicity. Contrary to the notion that 
social movements are dominated by irrational, mass action, 15 this thesis argues that for ethnic 
mobilization to occur, a group must first choose to mobilize according to ethnic rather than other 
(i.e. class) lines. As this thesis shall demonstrate, the Soviet era transformed natives from 
classless societies to those whose internal social organization mirrored those of the dominant 
society. Thus, aboriginal societies also exhibit internal divisions based on social class. As the 
responsibility of decision-making and collective organization tends to fall not upon the shoulders 
of the masses, but upon those of group leaders, this thesis also investigates the possible reasons 
for their having chosen ethnic identity as the basis for organization. Further, both the initiation 
and success of ethnic mobilization depend upon the strength of a group's opportunity structure. 
Soviet nationalities policy, as part of the larger modem-state building agenda, introduced 
segregationist measures while simultaneously implementing others aimed at assimilation/ 
integration. The potential of the modem state to affect the lives of natives allowed it to 
circumscribe ethnic identities for, and superimpose ethnic boundaries upon, natives as it saw fit. 
The preconditions for ethnic mobilization which permitted aboriginal peoples to re-claim the 
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right to define themselves and to determine their own ethnic boundaries were finally met during 
the Gorbachev era. The next two chapters discusses these developments in more detail. 
Current Approaches to Understanding Ethnic Mobilization 
This thesis outlines four current approaches to ethnic mobilization. The developmental, reactive 
ethnicity, and ethnic competition models are familiar to students of ethnicity. The fourth, less 
formalized ethnic sub-nationalism model offers insights into the dynamics which concern this 
thesis. All four approaches fall short of accounting for both the initiation and success of 
indigenous mobilization. This may be achieved by extending the ethnic sub-nationalism model. 
This section details the four approaches while the next section expands upon the fourth. 
The developmental model views ethnicity as a primordial attachment and ethnic 
mobilization as an "historical residue" from an earlier period. 16 Mobilization is likely only if a 
periphery remains outside of the national economy, if the economic, political and cultural gap 
between peripheries and the center widens, and if the channels through which representation 
may be secured and grievances voiced is inaccessible. This view assumes that ethnic cleavages 
remain important only in primordial communities and predicts that, with modernization and 
industrialization, functionally-based cleavages (i.e. class) will supersede those status-based 
cleavages (i.e. ethnicity) as the foundation for political organization.17 In the developmental 
view, a group's size is irrelevant. The typical ethnic group for mobilization is territorially 
concentrated and relatively socially isolated dominant groups. 18 The typical ethnic region is 
geographical. The ethnic group is typically poor and while members tend to be engaged in 
primary economic activities, mobilization may also occur in moderately industrialized regions.19 
The reactive ethnicity model views ethnicity as a modem phenomenon. Ethnic 
mobilization is a backlash to the notion that regional economic inequality and/ or the allocation 
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of valued roles and resources to dominant group members results from collective oppression.
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"Internal colonialism" and "cultural division of labor" models based on core-periphery and 
dependency-cycle dynamics are typical of this view.21 In this view, ethnic groups which are 
geographically peripheral, territorially concentrated, and economically disadvantaged are most 
likely to mobilize. This view assumes that modernization reinforces the overlap of ethnicity-
and class-based cleavages,22 since the ethnic minority is relegated to the lower strata within the 
larger society and predicts that class divisions eventually give way to ethnic interests. 23 
The ethnic competition model also views ethnicity as a modern phenomenon. Ethnic 
interests may predominate among stratified groups since "classes are economical1y defined and 
often contain a variety of ethnic groups, while ethnic divisions usually cross-cut class 
divisions. "24 In this model, ethnic mobilization is caused by some form of structurally-based 
provocation which increases competition between ethnic groups. Structural change heightens 
competition either by redistributing political benefits that force groups to compete for resources 
or by attracting ethnic collectivities to compete for benefits previously inaccessible. 25 While 
modernization erodes small-scale identities, it also intensifies the political viability of large-scale 
ethnic identities. 26 Thus, ethnic mobilization can be either emergent or resurgent. The latter 
occurs among previously mobilized groups experiencing a revival of solidarity after a period of 
inactivity (i.e. Catalans in Spain, Scots in Britain) and the former among formerly separate, even 
factious, and often culturally diverse groups (i.e. Hispanics or African Americans in the U.S.A, 
First Nations in Canada).27 Competition may, at times, even reinforce ethnic identities. In this 
model, group members are typically well-integrated and engaged in industrial activities. The 
opportunity for ethnic mobilization tends to be greater in economically-thriving regions and for 
relatively wealthy groups. In this model, the ethnic group must be large enough to significantly 
challenge the center and other ethnic competitors. It must also be territorially concentrated. 28 
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A derivation of the ethnic competition model, the sub-nationalism model offers insights 
into indigenous peoples29 and concerns the roles- of ethnicity and internal class differentiation in 
minority-majority political struggles. 30 It views ethnicity as a modem phenomenon and argues 
that ethnic mobilization is caused by some form of structurally-based provocation that generates 
opposition to the political center which cuts across classes within an ethnic group. The 
coincidence of ethnic- and class-based cleavages provides the minority dominant strata with two 
opponents-- the minority lower strata and the majority upper strata. The success of a minority' s 
ethnic movement ultimately depends upon securing the support of the minority's lower strata for 
its upper strata.31 In this model, ethnic identity becomes salient as a mobilizing force among 
minority upper strata in the face of external threats or pressures (i.e. degradation of ethnic 
territories, confiscation of lands). In the ethnic sub-nationalism model, ethnic mobilization is 
most likely to occur among well-integrated, territorially-concentrated groups with relatively low 
class conflict. Contrary to the ethnic competition model, this model views ethnic mobilization 
just as likely among groups that are not engaged in industrial economies as those that are.32 This 
model, as of yet, has only been used in an ad hoc manner by a few researchers. 33 
An Alternate Approach to Understanding Indigenous Ethnic Mobilization 
This thesis suggests that there are factors each of the current approaches to ethnic mobilization 
omit that may be crucial to understanding indigenous ethnic mobilization because of the unique 
factors native groups possess that other groups do not. The historical evidence concerning 
indigenous development in Russia offers stronger support for the ethnic competition and ethnic 
sub-nationalism models than it does for the others. These models agree on several key tenets, 
the most important being their view of causation. While they also agree that ethnic and class 
affiliations are compatible, the ethnic competition model does not take issue with the possible 
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effects of this overlap. The coincidence of these cleavages, on the other hand, constitutes the 
very substance of the ethnic sub-nationalism model. Structural change is relevant in the ethnic 
competition model insofar as it restructures ethnjc competition and in the ethnic sub-nationalism 
model insofar as it induces opposition to the center whlch cuts across class divisions. As thls 
thesis shall demonstrate, ethnic competition view of causation best explains the reasons for its 
initiation, while that of the ethnic sub-nationalism model best explains its relative success. 
Neither of these outcomes, independent of the other, sufficiently explains both the occurrence 
and success of indigenous mobilization in Russia. However, such an account may be possible by 
extending the ethnic sub-nationalism model. This thesis endeavors to achieve just this. 
While the developmental and reactive ethnicity views concern why ethnic mobilization 
occurs, the ethnic competition and sub-nationalism views largely concern how it happens. An 
alternate approach to understanding indigenous mobilization should involve a combination of 
elements from the first and latter two views. The ethnic sub-nationalism model better explains 
minority politics in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. 34 This model considers not only the structure 
of the social, and conduciveness of the political, environments but also endogenous influences in 
ethillc mobilization. An extension of this model may account for indigenous mobilization in 
Russia for it uncovers new variables and processes which promote ethnic mobilization. As this 
extended model draws on aspects of the developmental and ethnic competition models, it may 
also be useful in explaining both why and how ethnic mobilization occurs among indigenous 
peoples in Russia as well as why, in other cases, ethnic mobilization does not occur at all. As 
what does not occur is just as important as what does, this thesis explores some of the social and 
political forces that promote or downplay the politicization or demobilization of ethillcity, an 
aspect which is often not addressed by ethnic mobilization theorists. 35 
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This thesis seeks to extend the ethnic sub-nationalism model to accommodate our case 
study of indigenous groups in Russia. It seeks to broaden scholarly accounts of ethnic 
mobilization, which have traditionally focused on groups that are relatively well-integrated, 
wealthy, populous, and territorially concentrated, to also address those ethnic groups who have 
mobilized despite the fact that they possess none of these attributes. This thesis also seeks to 
clarify aspects (i.e. group size and relative wealth) that are vague within the original model. 
Methodology 
This thesis seeks to explain both why and how ethnic mobilization has occurred among 
aboriginal peoples in Russia by first drawing on the different possible theoretical approaches to 
ethnic mobilization and then seeing if there is, in fact, a need to extend any of the models 
outlined. The evidence used to determine the application of each model to this case study is the 
historical record. I draw upon both primary and secondary sources in this study, as well as my 
own field observations, communications, and interviews with local indigenous persons and other 
significant actors within the Sakha Republic between June and September 1995. 
Because there is great diversity among Russia's many ethnic groups, scholars and 
planners must award sufficient consideration to the cultural, historical, and environmental 
contexts in exploring the realities and future prospects for aboriginal peoples. The primary 
objective of this thesis is not to focus on a single group(s) with "sufficient consideration" but, 
rather, to underscore why it is critical to do so in order to enhance our understanding of the 
dynamics of ethnic mobilization. Indigenous mobilization within Russia is useful in expanding 
upon the variables which contribute to not only the initiation, but success, of ethnic mobilization. 
As such, it encourages us to reconsider much of what has been written on ethnic mobilization. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
From Self-Determination of Nations to Outright Assimilation: 
Indigenous Peoples in Soviet Russia 
The entrance of a new child into this world is one of the most momentous events in the Evenk 
life-cycle. While its significance is common to most other cultures, the rituals surrounding this 
occasion vary. One Evenk tradition entails that when a child has been successfully delivered, the 
part of the umbilical cord closest to the mother is to be cut and saved by her as insurance that the 
child will remain calm and happy throughout its life. 1 It is the conscious decision of the mother 
to respect this tradition that dears the path for the unproblematic development of her child. 
It seems that architects of the Soviet system could have learned a lesson from the Evenks, 
for with the birth of the Soviet Union so too should have the state permitted its many, diverse 
constituent nationalities to keep their umbilical cords-- their histories, their cultures, their 
lifelines. Had this been possible, the development of ethnic groups may have paralleled that of 
the ideal Evenk child in its untroubled nature. Instead, the experience of many of the so-called 
fringe nationalities in the Soviet Union entailed the deprivation of their cultures and identities. 
This chapter demonstrates both that the Soviet government treated aboriginal peoples 
differently than other peoples in many respects and that other state policies, though applied 
uniformly to ethnic groups throughout the Soviet Union, would have unique consequences for 
aboriginal development during the pre-Gorbachev era. It first provides an overview of 
indigenous life in the pre-Soviet era in order to highlight elements of continuity and 
discontinuity in the state's handling of indigenous affairs from the Tsarist to the Soviet era. It 
then outlines the ideas upon which Soviet nationalities policy was based and proceeds to 
highlight some of the contradictions of this policy area to have promoted indigenous identities 
and capacities. This is followed by a section on ethnic territories and a section on inter- and 
23 
intra-ethnic relations in Y akutia. Though applied uniformly throughout Russia, these policies 
still produced unique consequences for indigenous development in Yakutia. The last section 
finally addresses the recreation and maintenance of indigenous identities during the Soviet era. 
Historical Background 
While the Russians first laid claim to Yakutia's lands for the Tsar in the seventeenth century, 
they were not the first non-aboriginal group to infiltrate the region. It is estimated that the Sakha 
(Yakut) migrated to Yakutia from the Baikal region in the eleventh or twelfth century.2 Vitebsky 
writes, "[t]he Yakut thus came to occupy the centre of a world in which they dominated the 
smaller peoples in peripheral regions, not long before they themselves were to become gradually 
marginalised by the Russians. "3 The Sakha brought with them southern Siberian economies 
which contrasted sharply with those of local indigenous groups, some of whom were displaced 
into the more remote regions ofYakutia and some of whom were absorbed through inter-mixing 
(i.e. the Dolgans, who are basically a hybrid ofEvenks and Sakha). 
The arrival of the Sakha was preceded by the migration of the Tungus to Yakutia from 
regions further south.4 The Tungus migrated in different directions to form numerous 
ethnologically distinct peoples, including the Evenks and Evens. 5 As they moved northwards, 
these peoples encroached on traditional Yukagir lands, pushing them northwards.6 Throughout 
these various stages of infiltration, native tribal identities remained largely unaltered. 
Traditional native economies were based upon a combination of activities including 
reindeer pastoralism, hunting and trapping, sea mammal hunting, and fishing. The harvesting of 
locally available, renewable resources demanded nomadism or semi-nomadism. Local 
environmental conditions shaped land use patterns, demanding large territories to support small 
populations. 7 Kin-based relationships, consensus-based decision-making, and the absence of 
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government characterized the internal socio-political organization of these societies.8 These 
classless societies did not have rulers but leaders, and were based on social equality rather than 
hierarchy. The fact that these small-scale indigenous populations enjoyed a relative degree of 
autonomy well into the 1930s demonstrates their organizational abilities. 9 
Certain features of indigenous societies represent sources of conflict with modem st;;tes. 
The attributes of aboriginal societies with which modem states have contentions are their 
political independence, relative internal social equality, slow pace of expansion, and 
management of natural resources which is geared towards long-term sustained use.10 These 
contentions are important to an understanding of indigenous development within Russia since 
these· different attributes served as justification for their different treatment. 11 In spite of various 
uprisings and protests on the part of indigenous peoples during the Tsarist era, these cultural 
features were not deemed by the Tsarist state to be great threats to its rule. 12 Rather, it was the 
case that the continuous supply of yasak (tribute) to the Crown by native peoples required the 
perpetuation of these distinctive societal characteristics. 13 Such Tsarist policies were perceived 
to be overly protectionist by Soviet officials and hence; were replaced by those of an 
integrationist nature. This change in policy direction represents a discontinuity with the past in 
the administration of native affairs from traditional Tsarist era to the era of the modem state. 
While the Tsarist state did attempt to "civilize" its so-called backward14 natives, these 
generally aimed at religious conversion. The first state campaign of great consequence for 
indigenous life occurred under Soviet rule. The Soviet state became capable of intervening in 
the lives of its citizens and enforcing assimilative policies via modem-state building processes. 15 
The modern state's capacity to affect the lives of its peoples also represents a break from past 
eras. This change restructured indigenous ethnic boundaries from those known in Russia's 
absolutist era to those which conformed to the Soviet authoritarian, centralized model. 
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Peoples are often categorized into legal groupings for the convenience of state planners. 
Categorization is fundamental in laying the foundation for ethnic mobilization and gave rise to 
the multiple and overlapping indigenous identities which shaped the strategic framework which 
indigenous peoples currently employ in promoting collective interests. Although the Tsarist 
administration grouped indigenous peoples together with other peoples of Siberia (i .e. Sakha, 
Komi, Buryat) for policy purposes, in 1918 the Soviet government recognized these indigenous 
peoples as a distinctive entity, apart from the region ' s other ethnic groups. 16 This separate 
categorization, in effect, helped to institutionalize the broadest tier of aboriginal identity within 
Russia which would be significant in the subsequent mobilization of indigenous peoples. 17 
Soviet Russia: The Foundations of Social Policy 
Soviet nationalities policy, while purportedly aimed at fostering co-existence between Soviet 
peoples by eliminating ethnic differences and the "merging" (sliyanie) of nations, not only failed 
in its integrating capacity but actually institutionalized ethnic differences and reinforced ethnic 
identities. It is ironic that this policy, which was alleged to be the most important and enduring 
contribution to the establishment of the socialist order, 18 backfired on its proponents m a 
"nationalities explosion" that served to fuel the eventual collapse of the Soviet empire. 
While classical Marxism said little about the self-determination of peoples, it did 
bequeath a vision of historical determinism and a methodology from which the Soviet position 
was derived. 19 Though Bolshevik leaders recognized the great force of nationalism, they 
perceived it to be an outgrowth of discrimination born of absolutism and capitalism. The state's 
withering away under communism was to be followed by the eventual withering away of ethnic 
loyalties and their replacement by a new "internationalist proletarian consciousness". The belief 
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held by communist theorists was that such forces were neither supposed to dissipate overnight 
nor prior to the state's withering away, but were supposed to involve a gradual progression. 
Marxism-Leninism is rooted in the Morganian model of socio-economic development 
("Social Darwinism"), an evolutionary framework against which one can measure the "progress" 
of societies according to five stages: (1) the ur-society, (2) slave trade/ labor, (3) feudalism, (4) 
capitalism and (5) socialism. Given the tribalistic underpinnings of indigenous society, the 
Tsarist government diagnosed natives as "among the most backwards and downtrodden groups 
of the population [ofRussia],"20 an attitude which carried over into the Soviet era. However, the 
Soviet state's approach differed from that which preceded it in its aim to fully integrate native 
peoples into Soviet society. The "non-capitalist path of development" natives were to take 
entailed a jump from the first stage to the fifth, bypassing all intermediate stages. 21 The state 
perceived these groups as suitable candidates for this transition for both practical and ideological 
reasons. First, as communalism was the basis of both indigenous and Soviet societies, policy-
makers felt this would ease their transition from primitive communalism to modem socialism. 
Second, by promoting this path of indigenous development, the state embraced the notion that it 
was not necessary for peoples who lagged behind in their development to pass through the 
capitalist stage. 22 The outcome of such non-capitalist policy was significant to those involved in 
liberation movements elsewhere. As such a transition required thousands of years for Western 
European nations, the complexity and speed of the progression expected of Russia's myriad 
peoples helps elucidate some reasons for their uneven development. 23 
Initially opposed to the concept of national self-determination, Lenin eventually adopted 
a federal structure which was, if only on paper, to permit compact territorial ethnic groups some 
degree of autonomy. In practice, however, power remained centralized in the hands of the 
Communist Party. This "Leninist compromise" between socialism and nationalism served to 
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settle the debate between "assimilationists" and "autonomists"24 and resulted in a system which 
was "national in fonn and socialist in content". It was the notion of the "national" that was 
significant to indigenous groups since the Soviet system saw these groups elevated to "socialist 
nations", a status which in tum promoted shared ethnic identities between group members. 
Contradictions in State Policies- Integration vs. Segregation 
Modem state-building can be seen as the primary historical process explaining shifts in the 
state's approach to native peoples.25 Soviet nationalities policy pursued the internal 
pacification26 of Russia's natives by promoting integrationist measures while simultaneously 
implementing policies aimed at social segregation. Giddens defines social segregation as "the 
establishing of remedial organizations [or institutions] in specific types of locale that separated 
off certain categories of individuals from the remainder of the population. "27 
The state sought to eliminate competing aboriginal forms of political community via 
integration. This is apparent from the four foci of Soviet northern activity: ( 1) urbanization28 and 
settlement to support industrialization, (2) collectivization of natives and their traditional 
activities, (3) incorporation of natives into the Soviet economy, and (4) industrial resource 
development. 29 Figure 2.1 indicates the degree to which the first and fourth of these goals have 
been pursued. Other integrationist measures include: (a) sedentarization (via urbanization and 
villagization), (b) mandatory education, (c) affirmative action programs, and (d) recruitment of 
native cadres. On the other hand, the state reinforced ethnic differences and prevented full 
participation in Soviet life by natives via segregationist ·policies such as: (a) cultural 
marginalizatio~ (b) official recognition of peoples by nationality (i.e. via passports, censuses)/0 
and (c) creation of ethnic territories. 31 The contradictions of Soviet nationalities policy produced 
a policy pendulum that swung between encouraging the "blossoming of cultures" (razivet) and 
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the acculturation and outright assimilation of Soviet peoples (sliyaniye). As such, state policy 
bore unique consequences for aboriginal development in terms of the way natives thought about 
their ethnic identity (i.e. multiple, overlapping, situational), the political goals they pursue 
(influence rather than power, struggle for aboriginal territorial rights although not territorially 
concentrated), and the political strategy they use to promoting collective goals (multi-tiered 
structure, within-system approaches). 32 This section explores all aspects of Soviet nationalities 
policy except ethnic territories. This merits its own section which immediately follows. 
The internal pacification of the Soviet Union entailed the bureaucratization of day to day 
life and the expansion the state's administrative reach to include both "allocative" (i.e. money, 
labor power) and "authoritative" resources (i .e. bureaucracy, armed forces). 33 The political 
realm expanded to the national level via the state's collection and storage of information about 
its peoples and the use of this information in their co-ordination (and subjugation). The 
consolidation of administrative and disciplinary power and centralization of bureaucratic control 
depended upon the surveillance and routinization of Soviet life and was facilitated through 
repression of the citizenry. Indeed, these processes did serve to "pacify" these people, for as 
Fondahl notes "by the late 1950s, Natives passively accepted harmful state policies". 34 
One consequence of pacification was that Soviet nationalities policy served to displace 
rural natives from their lands by promoting sedentarization (urbanization, villagization). While 
this policy originally promoted their "collectivization" on the basis of existing social networks, 
collective farms subsequently underwent "amalgamation" (ukrupneniye) into larger state farms. 
This policy also resulted in a shift from camps to villages for nomadic hunters, herders, and 
fishers. 35 The centralization of native peoples and activities into such "built environments" 
allowed Soviet authorities to regularize their activities and to capitalize on their new-found 
opportunities for surveillance. So too did these localized centers of administrative power permit 
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the creation of bureaucratic hierarchies and the differentiation of social and economic activities. 
This differentiation made it possible for both those peoples who were class-divided at the time of 
the revolution and those whose socio-political organization later came to mirror such groups to 
simultaneously identify with status- (i.e. ethnic) and class-based cleavages. Because socio-
economic classes cut across ethnic groups, indigenous peoples as a whole do not occupy the 
lower strata of Soviet society as in the reactive ethnicity model. Here, the ethnic sub-nationalism 
model is appropriate for our analysis of indigenous ethnic mobilization within Russia. 
Sedentarization largely benefited the state. Native peoples, on the other hand, 
experienced a greatly increased potential for lawlessness in their alien social environment. 36 It 
also proved detrimental to community and family life for indigenes. The loss of native control 
over native territorial and ethnic markers put the state in a better position to secure what Balzer 
terms "progress insurance". 37 This represents a trade-off whereby parents can carry out a 
nomadic lifestyle if they agree to send all children of school-age to a boarding school (internal) 
for a minimum of eight school years. Another option that may be available in some regions of 
Russia is for the mother to move to the village where the school is situated so that her children 
may reside with her. In the internal, children of nomadic natives called tayozhniki and 
tundrovniki ("person of the taiga" and "person of the tundra") experience linguistic, social, 
spiritual and mental hardship while isolated from their family38 and face greater assimilative 
pressures than non-native children. 39 The sedentarization of the mother also generally results in 
the long-term separation of the parents, the alienation of women from numerous traditional 
native activities, and the further breakdown of social life and of the family unit.40 In addition to 
the erosion and/ or loss of traditional native skills and cultural features, the next chapter explores 
yet other implications of mandatory schooling for indigenous mobilization. 
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Other state measures aimed at integrating natives into Soviet society include the 
implementation of affirmative action programs and quotas in employment and in educational 
institutions, the recruitment and selection of national cadres from among native groups. 
Although the intention was to assimilate a number of indigenes who would then assist in 
assimilating the remainder of their ethnic groups, the outcomes were somewhat mixed. That is, 
while the native populations became relatively familiar with the dominant cultural influences in 
their respective regions (i .e. Russian and Sakha in the case of Yakutia), integrationist state 
measures bolstered the prospects for indigenous mobilization in other, unforeseen ways. State 
policies provided native peoples with both administrative capacities and skilled political 
leadership, both of which would advance indigenous mobilization in subsequent years. 
Ironically, urbanized, well-integrated indigenes, who were expected to promote the Soviet 
agenda among their peoples, instead lead the struggle for greater aboriginal self-determination. 
These realities question the developmental model outlined earlier, for only through such contact 
with the dominant society could these individuals have gained the knowledge and skills they 
required to successfully mount resistance in the form of an ethnic movement. 
Cultural marginalization is one way in which the state pursues segregationist aims. With 
the state's increased capacity for surveillance via sedentarization, it was able to systematically 
categorize "deviants" and then to socially segregate "enemies of the people" and others who did 
not fit its norm. Purportedly in the interests of society, the state secured the public ' s 
acquiescence to the persecution (or rehabilitation) of deviants and the forms such punishment 
might take. Among indigenes, Soviet authorities singled out shamans and other community 
leaders as exploiters of the people (kulaks). 41 Disciplinary power was exercised through harsh 
sentences, the severity of which was correlated with the degree of their perceived deviance. 42 
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Soviet authorities further culturally marginalized Russia' s indigenous peoples by playing 
upon nationalist sentiments of ethnic Russians and by stressing radical distinctions between the 
heart of Soviet society and out-groups such as the primitive natives. Politically, state efforts to 
undermine the authority of natives who traditionally held power meant that indigenous shamans, 
traders, and rich reindeer owners were effectively excluded from participating in local affairs. 
These people could neither be elected to tribal soviets when and where they existed, nor did they 
even have the right to vote.43 Initially, the state considered natives to be what Barth terms 
"pariah minorities", peoples who are "actively rejected by the host population because of 
behaviour or characteristics positively condemned, though often useful in some specific, 
practical way. ,,44 Despite their usefulness as key suppliers of transportation for northern 
development and of meat for a burgeoning population, dominant groups condemned many 
cultural features of natives (i.e. nomadism, illiteracy, lack of storage and preparation for the 
future). Consequently, their cultural distinctiveness proved an inescapable disability which 
prevented them from asswning an equal role in Soviet society to groups that were more like the 
dominant Russians. This rejection of native groups resulted both in their limited interaction with 
the dominant society and their placement at the bottom of the social and employment hierarchy 
while an immigrant work force asswned the upper echelons.45 While not true of all natives, this 
seems to be the general rule for those engaged in traditional native industries. 46 
Soviet nationalities policy prevented natives from achieving full participation in Soviet 
society in yet other ways. While state measures which officially recognized peoples by 
nationality rather than citizenship applied to all peoples (i.e. ethnic identification in passports 
and censuses), others were directed solely at aboriginal peoples. For instance, in the late 1920s 
the state implemented a judicial system and administrative agencies designed to "ease" natives 
into Soviet society. 47 The abolition of both this judicial system and the Committee of the North 
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in the mid 1930s may have been connected with the tendency to overestimate the progress made 
in the North at that time and with the view that socialism was victorious throughout the Soviet 
Union.48 The fact that these institutions were designed uniquely for the needs of native peoples 
indicated state recognition of ethnic differences and served to promote and even institutionalize 
their ethnic distinctiveness. Despite their short life, the ideals these institutions embodied and 
their memory would remain an important component of native identity. 
Ethnicity and Territoriality 
The socio-political development of minority ethnic groups is intrinsically rooted in the concept 
of territoriality. Sundry territorial-administrative forms of different rank comprised the Soviet 
federal hierarchy, including national (i.e. ethnic/ nativet9 units intended to provide certain 
peoples some degree of autonomy. Those designated for indigenous groups in the 1930s are 
outlined in Figure 2.2. That the distribution of territory and power was not uniform among 
groups highlighted the uneven nature of Soviet development and eventually debunked the myth 
of equality among Soviet peoples. There are several trends vis-a-vis ethnic territories within this 
federal system: (1) the inability of ethnic groups to obtain a national territorial-administrative 
unit, (2) the inability of ethnic groups to maintain national territories after having attained them, 
and (3) the failure of territories, once achieved, to ensure ethnic rights. An ethnic territory can 
be crucial in shaping a group's development as it may either activate or downplay ethnicity as an 
organizationally relevant force and may promote, prevent or delay the emergence of a people's 
ethnic consciousness. All of these factors bear directly upon the assimilative capacity of the 
state. Of the hundred-plus groups within Russia, most did not receive ethnic territories. What 
features distinguish those groups which achieved titular status from those that did not? One 
obvious factor is a group's size. State officials have deemed some groups (i.e. the Oroks, who 
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numbered 162 in 1926) too small to warrant their own ethnic territory. 50 Other demographic 
obstacles were wide dispersal over vast areas and low concentration in any one region. 51 State 
planners may have been reluctant to set aside ethnic territories for the smallest indigenous 
peoples who were slated for assimilation. As well, many groups were politically inactive and 
held weaker positions in many of Russia' s northern and Siberian regions than did non-natives, 
even where natives were in the majority. 52 
In 1930, Moscow began to designate some territorial-administrative units for aboriginal 
groups within Siberia and northern Russia. These included national okrugs (i .e. the Evenki 
National Okrug), and national raions (i.e. the Sakkyryrskiy National Raion). 53 Unfortunately, 
however, national territorial units experienced a loss of status. Between 1930 and 1931 , the state 
established fifteen national raions in the Y akut ASSR for all indigenous groups except the 
Dolgans. 54 National raions essentially disappeared in the 1936 constitution, resulting in the 
liquidation of some national raions, though many continued to be referred to as such. This all 
ended in 1980, the same year that the state downgraded the status of ethnically-based okrugs and 
oblasts from "national" to "autonomous".55 Autonomous regions did not confer special status or 
specifically include a privileged role in decision-making agencies for native peoples, who by 
then comprised but a small fragment of the regions' population. Still other ethnic units had 
witnessed their end with the policy of amalgamation ( ukrupneniye ). 56 
Why were these groups unable to maintain their designated national units? The answer 
to this lies not in the features of individual ethnic groups but within the modem state-building 
process and its facilitation through the state apparatus itself Stalin' s reign brought about the end 
of the protectionist era towards indigenes and the fundamental alteration of their political, 
demographic, and economic situation through policies which promoted their forced relocation, 
the amalgamation of collective farms into state farms, industrial development, and the mass 
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influx of migrant workers. Moscow's changing focus from policies intended to "ease" them into 
the modernized Soviet economy to those which rushed them saw regional activities subordinated 
to the needs of industrial development. Despite the abolition of national territories for 
indigenous peoples, the collective memory of their existence remains a powerful inspirational 
force in indigenous mobilization. This collective memory serves as a psychological springboard 
in indigenous mobilization, shaping the goals sought (i.e. to once again achieve territorial rights 
despite the fact that they are not territorially concentrated) through the mobilization process. 
After Stalin dissolved the Committee of the North in 1935, responsibility for indigenous 
peoples fell to the Main Administration for the Northern Sea Route ( Glavsevmorput '), the 
agency charged with the industrialization of the North57 and which declined this responsibility in 
1938.58 Although not directly responsible for native affairs, the Main Construction 
Administration of the Far North (Dal 'stroi), the Far East's other "quasi-independent fiefdom",59 
was the agency to most affect local natives. 60 Regional development occurred at the cost of 
several ethnic administrative units in Siberia. The state liquidated the Okhotsk-Even National 
Okrug in the late 1930s ostensibly because Dal' stroi was to use its center as a transit point for 
moving prisoners to work camps and wanted full control over the region.61 Dal'stroi operations 
eventually spanned the Magadan Oblast and Y akutia, severely impacting upon local indigenes. 62 
While the failure to gain and maintain ethnic territories has hindered indigenous 
development, other examples in the Soviet Union and elsewhere demonstrate that even well-
established ethnic territories can fail to ensure ethnic rights. The benefits of acquiring one's own 
ethnic territory have become limited due to the mass influx of non-native newcomers.63 As such, 
devolving power to such ethnic territories is not necessarily a viable way to ensure state 
protection for the rights of local natives. Decisions concerning resource development and land 
allotments in these regions have largely rested in the hands of non-natives. Indeed, in the early 
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years of the Soviet Union, the relative inexperience of most local natives in political affairs 
meant that ethnic Russians tended to dominate the soviets of even ethnically-based regions.
64 
While ethnic territories can promote ethnic rights, the flip side of the coin is that they can 
also serve to limit them. This occurs mainly "when the state declares that outside an ethnic 
homeland, members of an ethnic group are not entitled to ethnic institutions or rights. "65 The 
fact that Soviet officials designated the geographical borders of national. regions was problematic 
since ethnic territorial-administrative units often cut across traditional aboriginal homelands. 
This caused a state-imposed exclusion of members of ethnic groups outside titular regions from 
the privileges, however limited, that titular status conferred. This was the case for the national 
raions, which had the exclusive power to make locally-based decisions in certain spheres. 
Special rights were non-existent outside of a national raion for members of the titular nationality. 
Soviet administrative, legislative and territorial institutions not only promoted, but 
institutionalized, indigenous ethnic identities by pursuing contradictory state aims of integration 
and segregation of Russia's indigenous population. The outcome of these contradictions were 
most ironic, for it was upon these that the foundations for their eventual ethnic mobilization 
could be built. "Instead of reducing ethnic differences in favor of national level identities, these 
development processes promote ethnic mobilization by increasing economic and political 
competition and organizing it on the basis of ethnicity. "66 This competition finally manifested 
itself under the conditions introduced with the advent of glasnost' under Gorbachev. 
That ethnic mobilization was caused by structural change and restructured ethnic 
competition supports the ethnic competition model. The ethnic sub-nationalism model also 
holds that ethnic mobilization depends on structural change, but in the former model, such 
change needs to generate opposition to the center such that it cuts across the various classes 
within an ethnic group. While this tenet explains the relative success of some groups, it cannot 
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account for the initiation of indigenous mobilization within Russia. Thus, neither the ethnic 
competition nor sub-nationalism views adequately explain the dynamics of ethnic mobilization, 
for it is clear that the initiation and success of such movements depend upon structural change of 
two different sorts. 
Institutionalized Interactions and Inter-Ethnic Relations 
Areas which are home to both non-titular groups and second-order titular nationalities (i.e. 
Komi, Tuva, Buryat, and Sakha Republics) are comparable in terms of their common and largely 
institutionalized interactions between the center, non-titular, first-order and second-order 
nationalities. 67 These interactions and their contextual objectives are laid out in Table 2.1. Such 
interactions, combined with the effects of Soviet nationalities policy, have shaped the experience 
of individual aboriginal prospects in different ways. 
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Table 2.1 
Center 
First-order titular 
nationality 
Second-order titular 
nationality 
Non-titular 
nationality 
Patterns of Inter-Ethnic Relations 
S U B J E C T 
Center First-orr:kr titular Second-order 
natiorwlity titular nationality 
Integration Integration 
Liberation Competition Domination 
Collusion Liberation Competition 
Collusion Liberation Liberation 
Non-titular 
nationality 
Assimilation 
Domination 
Domination 
Competition 
Source: Ian Bremmer, "Reassessing Soviet nationalities theory," in Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor 
States, eds. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 14. 
The center's relationship with non-titular nationalities has followed a pattern of rushed 
assimilation rather than the gradual integration characteristic of its relationship with second-
order titular groups.68 While it was understood that non-titular nationalities would share the 
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same fate as titular nationalities-- incorporation into Soviet society-- the factor that 
distinguished the center's approach towards each was the perceived time scale required to 
achieve this.69 Employing the perspective from below, however, the relationship between 
aboriginal groups and the center may be seen as one of collusion. Aboriginal groups realize that 
only the center has the power to restrain first- and second-order titular nationalities with respect 
to their treatment of these non-titular nationalities. Thus, non-titular groups colluded with the 
center (i.e. in supporting a strong unitary state apparatus) to keep the titular groups to whom they 
were subordinated in line.70 In spite of the center's capacity to monitor inter-ethnic relations 
between titular and non-titular nationalities, however, Moscow did not continually do so, as is 
demonstrated within the experience of indigenous peoples in the Yakut ASSR. 
Historically, both Russian (first-order titular nationality) and Sakha (second-order titular) 
relations with local aboriginal peoples have been characterized by domination. This rings true 
not only during indigenous peoples' brief period as third-order titular nationalities between 1930 
and 1936 and for the Evens of the Eveno-Bytantaiskiy national raion after 1989 (when they 
achieved this status with their own ethnic territorial-administrative unit), but also before and 
after this period when they were non-titular groups. First- and second-order titular nationalities 
have enjoyed significant educational, employment, and social benefits.71 Just as first-order 
titular groups generally perceive other titular and non-titular groups as a threat to this 
"preferential treatment", so too do second-order titular groups tend to see third-order and non-
titular nationalities in the same manner. The reactive dominating tendency of upper-order titular 
groups has been institutionalized via the Soviet titular hierarchy. Consequently, Yakutia's 
natives have faced outbursts of ethnic chauvinism by both titular groups.72 Russian chauvinism, 
however, is most common among newcomers (prish/ie) to the region in contrast to Siberia's 
more respectful long-term inhabitants of non-native origin (referred to as Siberiaki or, m 
Yakutia, as Yakutiani). 
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In Yakutia, indigenous peoples face the double threat of Russification and Y akutization. 
As Vitebsky notes, "[f]or minorities in the Yakut republic, assimilation is complicated and 
perhaps less advanced because the surrounding dominant population is not Russian but Yakut."73 
Karklins identifies a key reason for a group's assimilation as its inability to satisfy its members' 
social needs, leaving the way open for a more substantial influence upon them by the closest 
majority nation. 74 While this may help to explain why the Sakha and Russians bore such an 
influence upon Yakutia's indigenes during the Soviet era, ethnic assertion among indigenous 
peoples represents an attempt to avoid domination, to attain those privileges from which they are 
excluded and to achieve greater self-determination. Employing the perspective from below, 
native ethnic assertion and pan-indigenism are efforts by third-order and non-titular group 
relations towards liberation from first- and second-order titular nationalities. 
The Construction of Indigenous Ethnic Identities and Boundaries 
Despite its failures in ensuring ethnic rights, the success of this territorial hierarchy has been the 
promotion of ethnic self-consciousness (samosoznanie) among ethnic minorities.75 The concept 
of an ethnic homeland has been important in groups' notions of themselves as ethno-political 
communities, for once an ethnic territory exists, it comes to embody a special meaning which 
can promote greater ethnic awareness and cultural identity even after such titular status and 
associated special rights have been removed. A ftxed territorial unit entails a fixed membership 
of an ethnic community which, in turn, facilitates greater self-knowledge and planning. Such 
territories provided indigenous groups with an administrative framework through which to work 
for change and a collective memory which has served as a psychological springboard in their 
struggle towards greater self-determination. 76 This system not only reinforced but also 
politicized the concept of ethnicity within these territories. 
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Soviet nationalities policy was replete with contradictory measures aimed at the 
integration of natives into Soviet society, on the one hand, and their segregation, on the other; 
they were betwixt and between. Removed from their traditional ways, yet not fully accustomed 
to the ways of the dominant culture, they were to share in the "Soviet experiment" with the 
country's non-native population. This, however, did not mean that they were integrated; instead, 
aboriginal peoples tended to be segregated from the very cultures to which they were supposed 
to assimilate. To the extent that rural peoples engaged primarily in agricultural activities 
experience a relative degree of social segregation, this described most of Yakutia' s native 
population. These facts offer some, albeit limited, support for the developmental model. 
That indigenous ethnic mobilization occurred under the leadership of indigenes who 
were both urbanized and well-integrated indicates that this mobilization is not likely to have 
occurred under conditions of outright social isolation. This is, while the majority of the 
population were subject to social segregation, the key mobilizers among the indigenous 
population generally were not. The Soviet system forged members of the indigenous elite 
through state policies which encouraged indigenes to assume various leadership positions (i.e. 
through various educational and employment opportunities). Both the degree of social 
integration of those who would lead the native movement and the compatibility of class and 
ethnic affiliations among Russia's natives accord with each of the ethnic competition and sub-
nationalism views. 
Just as territorial divisions were superimposed upon Yakutia's natives, the Soviet era 
witnessed the fundamental alteration of the ethnic boundaries of indigenous groups within 
Russia through the creation and reinforcement of new shared identities. The fact that natives no 
longer exercised full control over their own identities represents a discontinuity in ethnic 
boundary maintenance among native peoples from those known prior to the Soviet era. 
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Indigenous identities shifted from those solely associated with their immediate kin or clan to 
those which extended far beyond these groupings to the local, regional, and national levels. 
These changes suggest that ethnic mobilization resulted not simply from an historical residue, 
but from processes involved in modem state-building, thus challenging the developmental view 
of ethnic mobilization while upholding the ethnic competition and sub-nationalism views. 
While an ethnic homeland and other state policies and institutions are important in the 
fonnation of a group's ethnic consciousness, these alone were not sufficient to trigger 
indigenous ethno-political mobilization. Because repression reigned throughout most of the 
Soviet era, the political environment of the time did not pennit indigenous ethnic mobilization. 
As Tilly notes, "[g]ovemmental repression is uniquely important because governments specialize 
in the control of mobilization and collective action. "77 This period merely set the stage for the 
initiation of mobilization once certain causal conditions could be met (i.e. state tolerance of 
dissent). Only during the age of glasnost' would this play actually commence. It is those 
developments at the macro-level which eventually pennitted indigenous political mobilization to 
which the next chapter turns. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Gorbachev's "Pandora's Box": Meeting the Necessary Conditions 
for Indigenous Ethnic Mobilization 
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The Soviet state's power was based to a large extent on its intolerance of any questioning of its 
actions, including that of the state's superimposition of ethnic boundaries upon its peoples. This 
was all to change with glasnost' (openness), perestroika (restructuring) and Gorbachev's other 
reforms. When the forces of cultural pluralism challenged the territorial integrity and legitimacy 
of Soviet rule, the reforming center was forced to try mend some problem areas and eventually 
became willing to recognize ethnicity as a legitimate basis for political organization and 
representation. In this era, the necessary conditions for ethnic mobilization were met, ensuring 
that ethnicity would be a powerful instrument for furthering collective goals. 
This chapter examines macro-level (exogenous) developments which contributed to 
indigenous ethnic mobilization both during and after the Gorbachev era. These include state 
policies imposed "from above", support from external sources, and macro-political processes. 
First, it discusses the immediate effects for Russia's natives of state policies imposed "from 
above" during the Gorbachev era, paying particular attention to the heightened level of ethnic 
competition that resulted from these reforms. It then surveys those structural changes at the 
macro-level that fulfilled the necessary political and structural conditions for indigenous ethnic 
mobilization. It then analyzes exogenous influences which may account for divergent patterns of 
ethnic mobilization among indigenous groups of different regions of Russia. 
Glasnost', Perestroika and the Seeds of Ethnic Competition 
The reforms introduced under Gorbachev represent structural change to the extent that they 
reorganized political competition among ethnic groups. Ethnic mobilization, in tum, resulted 
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from this competition. Structural change (i.e. political climate and resultant state reforms) did 
not occur all of a sudden but was, instead, a gradual progression, the dissent and open criticism 
finally permitted under Gorbachev at first manifesting itself in protests, demonstrations and 
revolts throughout the country1 and eventually warranting a rejection of the traditional paradigm 
which characterized state-society relations within the Soviet Union. No longer were state 
interests indistinguishable from those of society, as the world awoke to the very threat the Soviet 
centre posed to its own citizens via environmental destruction and human rights violations. 2 
Gorbachev's policies on freedom of expression, private initiative and economic 
decentralization finally let the ethnic genie out of the bottle with the most notable and 
unintended political by-product of these reforms-- the emergence of politically assertive 
behaviour by the country' s myriad ethnic groups. Such assertiveness was often grounded in the 
very nationalism and regionalism that would see the empire' s own undoing. Although 
Moscow's budding recognition of peripheral peoples initially focused on titular nationalities and 
ethnic groups demonstrating tendencies of "modem" rather than "orthodox" nationalism, 3 the 
state did eventually take an interest in the northern minorities, albeit a few years later. 4 By this 
time, it had become necessary for indigenous peoples to compete for the attention of, and 
political resources from, the Soviet government in order to protect group interests. 
While state-sponsored aboriginal books, newspapers, television and radio programs 
profoundly shaped indigenous ethnic identities during the Soviet era, the open presentation of 
politically-driven issues by the liberal Soviet media, which began in 1988, presented natives with 
fora by which to express their concerns. By both providing detailed accounts of the plight of 
Russia's indigenes and casting doubt on the state's role in fostering indigenous development, 
native and non-native writers alike have helped identify the problems and prospects for natives 
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socio-economic and political development in Russia. 5 This openness was key in the indigenous 
struggle to regain control over their ethnic markers by securing concessions from the state. 
Gorbachev loosened state control in the cultural sphere and reduced censorship in order 
to influence the intelligentsia, writers and media workers to mobilize popular support for his 
policies;6 however, the popular media became liberalized even further than intended and 
included the views of formerly voiceless citizens. Such changes, coupled with the state's 
responsiveness to various ethnic demands, expanded the political realm by restructuring the 
methods of distributing political benefits and intensified the saliency of ethnic identities. This 
restructuring, in turn, forced groups to compete for resources. As subordinated peoples, natives 
traditionally have not had access to the media and other political resources. In the new political 
climate, the state could no longer prevent natives from voicing their grievances.7 
Given the symbolic and practical importance of the North in Russia, the public awoke 
with interest to the plight of northern natives. Debates implicating the state for failing to look 
after its natives revolved around a number of themes: health, environmental degradation, 
housing, native language education, and transportation cutbacks. Figure 3.1, for instance, 
exhibits some of the problems to have caused a deterioration of living conditions for the 
inhabitants of the mainly Evenk community of Iengra in southern Yakutia. The most palpable 
nationwide concern regarding the indigenous population was the poor state of the northern 
environment (refer to Figure 2.1 ). 8 As in the Union republics, environmental and ethnic interests 
within Yakutia were united in the struggle for cultural revival. In Yakutia, it was not indigenous 
peoples, but the Sakha, who spearheaded the environmental movement. While indigenous 
mobilization did occur, it was limited in its success due to several factors: poor leadership, low 
education level, small numbers, distance, and little desire to revive national cultures (especially 
among youth).9 That there are few cultural specialists and linguists has also hindered 
Figure 3.1 Difficult Living Conditions in the Evenk village of lengra, Southern Yakutia 
These photos demonstrate some of the problems related to the daily life of this community. 
~iii~~ 
(a) State gold mining operations encroach on former community lands, 
corning as close as 50 m. from the village and polluting the only fresh 
water source accessible to villagers throughout the full year. r- .. --
(c) Panorama of the highway and dwellings of Iengra. A one room 
shack often houses an entire family of 5 or more. 
(b) Sanitation and running water are absent in most villages. 
(d) The intemat of Iengra, which sits alongside the comprehensive 
school. Construction of a new school began over 9 years ago and still 
awaits its completion. 
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ethnic mobilization, for they are needed if native peoples are to pursue the goals (i.e. teaching of 
native language) they have set for themselves. Considering that mobilization has occurred 
among indigenous peoples whose linguistic base is generally weak questions the developmental 
tenet that the linguistic base of the typical ethnic group must be strong. It should be noted that 
this language loss, an outcome of assimilation, still constitutes one of the driving forces in the 
aboriginal movement, thus lending some support to the ethnic sub-nationalism view. 
In Yakutia, many grievances and issues of critical importance to indigenous peoples are 
also shared by the Sakha and by long-term non-native residents. These commonalities lends 
support to local native concerns in a way not possible for their counterparts in areas heavily 
dominated by non-native newcomers (prish/ie) . One such concern common to local residents 
involved the twelve so-called peaceful underground nuclear explosions carried out in Yakutia. 
The republic's government made significant head-way in pressuring Moscow to abandon testing 
in the region. 10 While other factors are mainly to blame for the damage done to the region's 
environment, people, and livestock, nuclear explosions also played a part. 11 Although concerns 
for Yakutia's peoples, the implications for natives are often greater than for other groups due to 
the direct reliance of many natives on the environment and on the continued health of reindeer. 12 
Glasnost' also presented indigenes with an opportunity to voice their contentions with 
non-native newcomers. Areas with a high level of resource exploitation and non-native in-
migration exhibit tension 13 which manifests itself as violence and aggression (often of a criminal 
nature) by non-natives towards natives. In Yakutia's Aldan region, according to one scholar at 
the Institute of Northern Minorities' Problems, poachers killed a native herder simply because he 
tried to protect his reindeer from being shot. 14 The same person told of non-native passers-by 
whom have also been known to cut off the tongue of a reindeer, inevitably dooming it to death 
through its inability to forage for food or by bleeding to death. 15 Despite the successes of 
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glasnost', legal forms of harassment are also still common. For instance, in Yakutia' s Chul 'man 
airport, I witnessed a police officer harassing all natives present, impatiently demanding their 
passports and other identifications. 16 Little or nothing is done about such harassment, inaction 
which is indicative of the institutionalized authority which characterizes relations between most 
natives (those that are still non-titular) and titular groups in Russia (refer to Table 2.1 ). 
Some concerns brought forward in the popular media are exclusive to indigenous peoples 
such as the poor general health of, and high death toll among, the northern minorities. 17 A key 
factor contributing to the latter problem in rural areas is the high incidence of accidental deaths 
among natives, many of which implicate the wide-spread abuse of alcoho1. 18 While alcohol also 
contributes to the death toll via certain chronic, alcohol-related diseases, the reality is that non-
medically related deaths involving alcohol (i.e. homicide, suicide, accidents), taken together, 
tend to claim the lives of more native persons than do alcohol-related medical problems.19 
Just as Soviet nationalities policy was introduced to diverse ethnic populations who were 
already on an unequal footing, perestroika also put many native peoples at a disadvantage. 
While people must keep pace with structural changes in their environment, the pace of economic 
restructuring in Russia made it difficult for aboriginal groups to do so. As Dienes predicted, " . . . 
the downward spiral of the economy will no longer afford any time for coherent plans and 
schemes. In that case, turmoil and ungovernable improvisation will take over in both central and 
peripheral regions."20 Native peoples were negatively affected by policies related to economic 
downsizing, production rationalization, cost accounting, and self-financing.21 The state's failure 
to assist these peoples in the face of these difficulties exacerbated those problems rooted in 
Soviet nationalities policy. In other words, while nationalities policy institutionalized an uneven 
ethnic playing field, perestroika fertilized it. These problems underscored the need for action 
and thus, added impetus to the politicization and mobilization of Russia's aboriginal peoples. 
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By the end of 1994, Yakutia's average living cost stood at 195% and income per capita at 
208% of the federal average.22 As the highest paying positions are found in the industrial sector 
and the lowest in rural, agriculturally-based operations such as state fanns (sovkhozy ), 
perestroika hit reindeer herders, hunters, fishers, and women tent workers (chumrabotnit:,y) 
particularly hard. While perestroika's effects were felt throughout Siberia,23 some of its negative 
effects are felt particularly hard within the native experience. Soviet policy relegated traditional 
native industries to the bottom of the employment hierarchy; perestroika further institutionalized 
such inequities. 
One negative outcome of perestroika was that state-protected lands used for traditional 
native industries was shrinking24 due to the state's re-allocation of lands for industrial 
development, for railway or highway construction, and for future privatization25 (see Figure 2.1). 
Transfer of these lands for non-agricultural use has disrupted reindeer migratory routes and has 
forced natives to carry out traditional activities even further away from the collective' s center 
than previously.26 Gun permits must be obtained every three months, an impossibility given the 
infrequent visits to the village by hunters or herders.27 Perestroika's outcomes thus reinforced 
the consequences of Soviet nationalities policy, in terms of both the geographical separation of 
nomadic natives from their families and the loss of native control over native. lands. 28 
The heightened cost, and state withdrawal, of subsidies for transportation, machinery and 
technology made life difficult. 29 These rising costs negatively affected natives in several key 
ways. First, increased freight charges to Yakutia drove the price of sale goods up drastically. 
Second, the cost of production also shot up with the increased cost of benzene and the 
heightened demand for helicopter transport by state farms. The former problem not only lead to 
shortages of sale goods, but it passed their increased cost on to the consumers. In contrast, the 
latter problem did not result in serious produce shortages and the extra costs incurred rested with 
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the producers. 30 The cutbacks state farms had to make meant cutbacks for their workers. Many 
working in traditional industries have not been paid in over three years. 3 1 Money formerly used 
for wages is now used merely to keep the state fann afloat. Transport of reindeer to the village 
for slaughter and the distribution of produce consumes most of the collective's budget. 32 
These problems constitute what can be termed the compounding effect of Soviet 
nationalities policy or the aggravation of negative outcomes of one policy by another, the 
resultant damage being even greater. In support of the ethnic sub-nationalism model, native 
groups began to assert themselves in the face of what they perceived as not only threats to their 
ethnic identity, but to their very survival. Indeed, when ethnic consciousness is the last living 
remnant of one's former ethnic existence " ... it begins to acquire an improbable energy-- the 
energy of pain. "33 While such threats resulted from Gorbachev' s economic refonns, yet other 
reforms (i.e. glasnost', constitutional reforms) served to restructure the system of political 
rewards and benefits (i.e. media coverage, state subsidies), thus also supporting the ethnic 
competition perspective. The legacy of Soviet nationalities policy, coupled with this 
compounding effect, pressured native peoples to compete for resources in order to protect and 
promote their collective interests. Ethnic competition intensified among Russia's indigenes with 
the attrition of state measures which promoted ethnic segregation and special ethnic privileges. 
As our case study indicates, targeting specific ethnic groups in state policy may institutionalize 
ethnic differences and even increase the likelihood of ethno-political mobilization. 
Mobilizing the Voiceless: The Necessary Political and Structural Conditions 
The level of ethnic assertiveness and competition exhibited in Russia during the Soviet demise 
was unparalleled at any other point in Soviet history. While there was a fair amount of ethnic 
dissent in the 1960s, direct challenges to the center over Soviet nationalities policy rarely 
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occurred until after Gorbachev acceded to power. 34 What brought on this heightened level of 
political activity in Russia? Various macro-political developments of the Gorbachev era 
provided ethnic groups with the opportunity not only to voice their concerns and openly criticize 
the state, but to mobilize politically to represent group interests. 
The point at which ethnic identity becomes salient as an organizing force depends upon 
the situational constraints upon, and strategic utility of, this identity.35 Identity markers (i.e. 
class, language, citizenship) were dictated to indigenous populations during the Soviet era, thus 
circumscribing ethnic identities and boundaries. Opportunities that arose with glasnost' rid 
natives of some of these situational constraints, making it possible to openly explore other 
identity markers (i.e. clan, religion, ethnicity). While retaining Soviet citizenship as an identity 
marker, native leaders still chose ethnicity as their basis for organization. Ethnic identification 
can be created, maintained, and transformed into the source of group mobilization when 
organization on this basis is perceived to offer competitive advantages in the political arena. 
Several key developments, notes Poelzer, furnished natives with the opportunity to 
initiate their struggle towards aboriginal self-government.36 The first, the existence of a dissent-
permitting society, is addressed in the previous section. This change gave rise to two other 
developments which were crucial to indigenous mobilization: constitutional change, and state 
responsiveness to international pressure. These processes, in tum, led to the state's willingness 
to recognize ethnicity as a legitimate basis for political organization and representation. 
Constitutional change provided natives with the opportunity to redefine their relationship 
with the state. While debates mainly focused on increased powers for existing sub-national 
units, aboriginal groups mobilized around the prospects of self-government that such reform 
might afford (this is similar to the situation where Quebec pressured for additional rights in the 
Canadian constitution, thus also opening the way for such demands from indigenous groups). 
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The ultimate significance of the constitutional debate, Poelzer reminds us, is that "without these 
broader debates regarding the constitutional division of power .. . it is very likely that aboriginal 
demands for greater political autonomy . . . would not be entertained. "37 In terms of 
constitutional change, the Yakut SSR declared sovereignty on September 27, 199038 and adopted 
its own constitution in April 1992, at which time it emphasized its ethnic status by changing its 
name to the Sakha Republic (Yakutia).39 This constitution subordinated federation laws to those 
of the republic and claimed republican ownership of its natural resources. These assertions 
bolstered aboriginal development in Y akutia by entrenching their constitutional rights and in 
terms of the policies introduced on these premises (i .e. self-government for nomadic natives).40 
Constitutional development at the regional level has been a crucial factor in the success 
or failure of indigenous mobilization at the local level. 41 In Y akutia, constitutional development 
bolstered the native movement chiefly by entrenching certain aboriginal rights within its 
constitution. While article 69 of the Russian Federation's constitution guarantees respect for the 
rights of its indigenous minorities in accordance with the norms and principles of international 
law,42 it was the rights secured in the republic's constitution that laid the seed for protective state 
measures to come. Regional constitutional development empowered the republic to establish 
new concepts of land ownership (i.e. aboriginal self-government) outside of federal legislation. 
While federal constitutional development has improved the opportunity structure for indigenous 
mobilization within Russia, such development at the regional level serves to enhance the 
likelihood of its success. This double insurance creates further opportunity to restructure 
indigenous-state relations through securing state recognition of aboriginal claims. 
The unequal apportionment of constitution-related rights means that indigenes need to 
rely of federal actions more in lower-level territorial-administrative units than in Yakutia. While 
constitutional and ensuing legislative developments within the republic have benefited local 
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natives, the only self-governing arrangements currently available to those of lower-level units are 
those stipulated either by federal decree (ukaz) or resolution (postanovleniye), the 
implementation of which is not uniform throughout regions. Even if Moscow passes legislation 
on the status of indigenous peoples, republic-level actions will likely still play a critical role in 
enhancing the prospects for native self-government. This would allow Yakutia' s indigenes to 
avoid some of the problems (i.e. perversion of existing policies by local authorities) found in 
regions where natives must rely solely on federal legislation. 43 Prospects for native self-
government are also limited by legislation which conflicts with federal decree No. 397, thus 
permitting regional authorities to impose time limits and fees for aboriginal land-use rights upon 
family-clan communities.44 Leiislation on nomadic communities in Yakutia, in contrast, 
stipulates that land granted to a nomadic community shall be without cost or a set time limit.45 
State responsiveness to international pressure was the third key variable which permitted 
the initiation of indigenous ethnic mobilization. Native interests came to be articulated at the 
international level via the national association's linkages to other trans-national indigenous 
institutions such as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Nordic Council, the Arctic 
Leaders' Summit and other international institutions such as the United Nations Working Group 
on Indigenous Peoples and the International Labor Organization (IL0).46 Not only did such 
external contacts introduce them to models of, and strategies for, aboriginal self-determination, 
but the support secured through these linkages also constituted new bargaining chips on the part 
of Russia's national indigenous association. These linkages have given non-titular ethnic groups 
such as native peoples channels through which to represent their interests to various levels of 
government, to non-governmental organizations, and to native groups worldwide. 
International contacts can also affect change at the local and regional levels, as 
demonstrated by participation by the Institute for Northern Minorities' Problems in the 1994 
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parliamentary hearings which ratified ILO Convention 169,47 the appeals of the Committee to 
Save the Kolyma J{iver Basin to the Commission on Human Rights to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples within that region,48 and the application of the Y ukagir people to the United 
Nations for "disappearing nations" status in order to emphasize the crisis which they are 
currently undergoing.49 In spring of 1996, United Nations representatives attended a seminar in 
Yakutia on social protection for native peoples. 50 It is ironic that the international pressure to 
which the Soviet state responded is, ironically, a product of wide-spread indigenous appeals 
which the state has funded either directly or indirectly. 
Uneven Aptitudes and Gains in Ethnic Mobilization 
While both micro- and macro-level influences affect ethnic mobilization, divergent mobilization 
patterns are less a result of the former than the latter. State policies, for instance, contribute to 
ethnic mobilization when they provide groups with the opportunity to mobilize along ethnic 
lines. As the intersection of Soviet nationalities and regional policies demonstrates, the same 
opportunity structure did not exist for all peoples. This overlap generated uneven opportunities, 
mobilizational capacities, and varying rates of success among native groups. So too did it affect 
regional governments (i.e. constitutional development, devolution) and the support of dominant 
nationalities differently. These factors affected indigenous mobilization in Yakutia differently 
than elsewhere and affected indigenous ethnic mobilization differently than that experienced 
among other ethnic groups. These differences are laid out in Table 3.1. 
Patterns of indigenous mobilization also depended on a region's rank in the Soviet 
territorial hierarchy. Soviet autonomous republics had greater rights than Russia's other regions, 
differences which would be consequential in the post-Soviet era for regional and, by extension, 
aboriginal development. Republics have exclusive rights to their own constitutions, a second 
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Table 3.1 Using Ethnic Mobilization Theory to Contrast Instances of Mobilization within Russia 
Can occur among groups that are or 
are not geographically peripheral• 
To some extent (via social 
segregation); communication and 
transportation links relatively 
b 
Can occur in regions that are or are 
not thriving economically • 
Yes, if measured in monetary terms; 
no, if measured in terms ofland and 
resources (to which they hold a licit 
To some extent (via social 
segregation); communication and 
transportation links relatively 
in some 
No 
Can occur in regions that are or 
are not thriving economically 
Yes, if measured in monetary 
terms; no, if measured in terms of 
land and resources (to which they 
hold a licit · d 
No 
No 
Can occur among relatively 
socially isolated or integrated 
groups 
Can occur among groups with 
a strong or weak linguistic 
base 
Can occur in regions that are 
or are not thriving 
Can occur among groups that 
are or are not relatively 
wealthy 
Yes 
Yes 
(for 
• While some regions of the Sakha Republic may not seem so peripheral (urban centers), many regions of the republic 
remain difficult to access. Some such communities may only be reached by air, on horseback, or on reindeer from 
another suitable landing spot [Author's fieldnotes, Yakutsk, September 1995]. This problem has worsened with the 
growing infrequency of outside contacts and shipments via air. 
b The degree of social isolation (or segregation) is largely conditioned by the availability ot: and access to, systems of 
communication (i.e. postal service, telephones, fax, popular media, etc.) and transportation (i.e. travel outside by 
locals, visits by tourists, delivery of supplies). 
c While the Sakha Republic, as a whole, is experiencing regional economic growth, particular regions within the 
republic are either declining economically, while others have remained constant. The degree of industrialization and 
regional economic growth of a region tend to determine the extent to which communication and transportation 
infrastructure has been developed. 
d The exception to the rule with respect to monetary resources are the Nenets of the Yamal Peninsula who reached a 
settlement with natural gas firms; however, this was acquired only as a result oflocal activism. 
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official language, ownership of its resources, and larger budgetary transfers. 51 Since republics 
used ethnic claims to achieve and maintain an elevated status, republics responded to demands 
for regional equality by forming a united front to protect their privileges. 52 Asymmetrical 
federalism has endured and despite attempts by some to create a symmetrical federal state, these 
efforts have thus far failed and may continue to fail for the foreseeable future . 53 
Macro-political processes also affect developments at local and regional levels. The 
greater relative success of indigenous mobilization in Yakutia is largely an outgrowth of modem 
state-building processes which promote industrialization and assimilation. While both Yakutia 
and other regions experienced such development, they differed in the extent of its effects. This 
would be critical to the success of indigenous mobilization within Yakutia. As Moscow relied 
heavily upon Yakutia's raw resources for its hard currency exports, it placed greater emphasis on 
developing communication and transportation infrastructure within the republic than it did in 
regions further north-east, for instance. Figure 3.2 indicates the extent to which the republic's 
transportation routes have been developed. These networks spun the intricate web that 
substantiates pan-indigenous organization by allowing rural natives ongoing contact with 
administrative centers at all levels and, in later years, with each other. 54 The extent to which 
transportation and communication links are developed is typically related to industrialization. 
These links would lead to the greater relative success of natives in Yakutia than elsewhere. 
At the same time, policies designed to promote acculturation unintentionally armed 
natives with the resources needed to get ahead in the larger society. Because native peoples, 
who comprise only two percent of Yakutia's population (see Figure 3.3), face world views of 
both of these groups. That the region's migrant population did not do the same gave natives a 
comparative advantage over newcomers, especially with the introduction of Sakha as the 
republic's second official language. This double dose of integration, to a limited extent, the 
Figure 3.3 
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Between 1959 and 1970 the composition of aboriginal peoples fell from 3% of a total population of 486,700 to only 
2% of a total population of 664,123. It has since remained at 2% although the population had increased by nearly 
64.74% to a total population of 1,094,065 as recorded in the 1989 census. 
Sources: Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 555; Tanya Argounova, "Federal Relations Between Yakutsk and Moscow" (M.Phil. thesis, 
Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge, 1995), 51 as derived from Goskomstat, Informational 
Bulletin of the Social and Economic Situation in the Republic for January-December I 99 3 (Y akutsk, 1994). 
double threat of Russification and Yakutization, they became acquainted with the life ways and 
improved the opportunity structure for Yakutia's natives in the face of ethnic competition, thus 
challenging the developmental view that relative social isolation and a strong language base 
improves the likelihood of mobilization. 
Despite integrative measures on the part of the Soviet government, indigenous peoples on 
the whole continued to experience relative social segregation, thus supporting the extended 
ethnic sub-nationalism model previously presented. The reforms introduced under Gorbachev 
restructured political competition in ways that encouraged the promotion of ethnic differences 
among populations. Nagel and Olzak inform us that " ... instead of reducing ethnic differences 
in favor of national-level identities, these development processes promote ethnic mobilization by 
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increasing economic and political competition and organizing it on the basis of ethnicity."55 
Ethnic competition does not stem from history alone. It is an outcome of modem processes, 
especially those promoted by modem state policies. This chapter has explored the exogenous 
factors to influence aboriginal development. The next chapter investigates those developments 
at the micro-political level which have affected indigenous mobilization in Russia. 
• 
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1 Even Yakutia witnessed such mobilization at an early stage, with the occurrence of student riots in 1986 in Yakutsk. 
For a first hand account of the uprising and the official reaction, see Matjorie M. Balzer and Uliana A. Vinokurova, 
"Nationalism, Interethnic Relations and Federalism: The Case of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia)," Europe-Asia Studies 
48, no. 1 (1996): 101-120. 
2 Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 13-19. Among others to have questioned the inevitable overlap in state and 
societal interests, Tickner challenges the liberalist, economic nationalist and Marxist paradigms that have lent 
credence to this assumed coincidence of interests. The USSR is a case where Tickner' s theory depicts the Soviet 
reality [J. Ann Tickner, Gender and lntemational Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). 
3 While orthodox nationalism involves the pursuit of political, economic, and cultural autonomy within the system, 
modem nationalism advocates secession and independence and/ or rejection of the system's ideological mold. For an 
expansion on these two forms of nationalism, see Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the 
USSR." 
4 Indeed, the Chair of the Department of Indigenous Peoples' Affairs of the Ministry of Peoples of the Sakha 
Republic noted that in accordance with several other social movements in the region, the period of cultural 
renaissance for the republic's native peoples began in 1989 [Avgusta D. Marfusalova, Interviews, Yakutsk, 12 July 
1995 and 23 August 1995]. 
s Among non-native writers, see A.I. Pika and B.B. Prokhorov, "Bol'shie Problemy Malykh Narodov," Kommunist 
16 (November 1988): 76-83, translated as "Soviet Union: Big Problems of Small Ethnic Groups," in International 
Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (JWG/A) Newsletter 51 (1989): 122-35. This article was key to the 
indigenous movement in Russia, especially considering that it was printed in the party's own journal. For responses 
to this article see "Sever oshibok ne proshchayet," Kommunist 5 (1989): 65-74. Among other non-native writers, 
see V. Sharov, "Mali li zemlia dlia malykh narodov," Literaturnaia gaze/a, 17 August 1988. Some renowned native 
writers include Aipin, Mongo, Gaer, Ledkov, Sangi, Nenyang, Nemtushkin, Sleptsov, Etylen, and Rytkheu. Several 
articles which have been translated into English are revealing. See Yeremei Aipin, "Not by Oil Alone," Moscow 
News, 8 January 1989: 8-9; and Aipin, "Halt the Exodus to Nowhere," Moscow News, 19 March 1989. For a quick 
overview of this literature see Kathleen Mihalisko, "Discontent in Taiga and Tundra," Radio Liberty Research, 7 July 
1988, RL 296/88. 
6 Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR 
(London: Harnish Hamilton, 1990), 237. 
7 Ethnic assertiveness affects the cultural, social, economic, and political spheres. This movement also incorporates 
traditional elements of native spiritual culture into efforts directed at national renaissance (i.e. shamanism). In light of 
the persecution shamans suffered under Soviet rule and the general atheistic tendencies of that era, the persistence of 
the spiritual beliefs ofRussia's aboriginal peoples indicates the strength of these ancient cultures (note: the same can 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Indigenous Mobilization During and After the Period of Soviet Demise 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the "socialist nations" were faced with what can be 
termed the "freedman's dilemma". This is, after a life of imprisonment, the freedman confronts 
an unfamiliar social and institutional setting in which he finds it difficult to function. Unable to 
grasp such ideas as individualism, equality before the law, personal freedom or responsibility, he 
exercises his freedom heedlessly, spelling his own downfall either by death or by re-
imprisonment. Hence, the freedman ultimately faces a dilemma: voluntarily submit to 
incarceration with its familiarity, predictability, and stability or choose the path of freedom with 
its demand for responsibility and self-control, as well as its potential for self-destruction. 1 The 
"freedman's dilemma" may be even more difficult for Russia's indigenes due to their profound 
reliance upon the center. In deeming natives eternal wards of the state, Soviet policymak:ers 
institutionalized their position of dependence, especially regarding state protection of aboriginal 
lands and resources. Securing greater control over their own destiny demands the continued 
organization and mobilization of aboriginal peoples. 
This chapter examines those micro-level (endogenous) developments which contributed 
to indigenous mobilization during and after the Gorbachev era, with specific attention to the 
implications of Soviet nationalities policy for indigenous ethnic identities, socio-political 
organization, and strategy. It assesses some of the successes and challenges of indigenous 
mobilization, first addressing the local and regional levels in Y ak:utia and then addressing the 
nationwide level. This chapter finally scrutinizes the key consequences of state policy for 
indigenous mobilization in terms of its effects on indigenous identities, political goals, resources, 
and strategies. This last section also identifies those micro-level variables which differentiate 
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between patterns of mobilization for indigenous peoples in Yakutia and elsewhere in Russia, as 
well as between indigenous peoples as a whole and other ethnic groups in Russia. 
Ethnic Identity Formation: The Local and Regional Levels 
Ethnicity can be a potent force in terms of political mobilization if it is well organized. There 
are three overlapping levels of political organization for Russia's indigenes-- local, regional, and 
nationwide-- each of which have been shaped by state policy. 2 For instance, because the state 
both settled peoples of different tribes (i.e. Yukagirs and Evens) together in the same 
communities and ignored such factors as clan affiliation in the settlement of peoples of the same 
tribe, the state-created community would replace the tribe, band, and clan as the primary 
ordering force of political life. Because it is the local level which most closely emulates 
traditional aboriginal political organization and it is at this level that aboriginal bids for 
autonomy are most likely to be realized, it is with this level that the deepest political attachment 
lies. This contrasts sharply with the chief political affiliation of most modem states, in which 
political identities lie at the national level first. 
The center responded to demands for local autonomy in April of 1990 with the 
introduction of two laws that could be used to further this aim- "On General Principles of Local 
Self-Government" and "On Free Ethnic Development of the Citizens of the USSR Living outside 
their Ethnic Territories or Having no Such Territories within the USSR".3 The former was 
intended to allow peoples to establish units of local self-administration. In reality, only after 
republican law could it be used by natives as a measure of local control where they comprised a 
majority. The latter law, in contrast, presented natives with the opportunity to form their own 
ethnic territories even if they were in the minority. While this law was significant for natives 
throughout Russia, other state measures would more profoundly affect Yakutia' s native peoples. 
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Indigenous mobilization at this level must be promoted " . . . by facilitating the survival of 
a particular environment as a bearer of a particular ethnicity in forms that do not lead to its 
destruction".4 While native self-government in Yakutia may take several different forms in the 
future, existing legislation makes provisions for but one form-- native rural administrations 
based on the nomadic tribal obshchina (commune).5 Of the 183 obshchinas created by 
September of 1995, about 50 entailed the restoration of abandoned settlements.6 The two new 
Yukagir communities, Tekelobok and Chaila, are instructive with respect to the challenge of 
accommodating both traditional and modem facets of ethnicity within self-governing units. 
First, because Tekelobok is both an obshchina and a settlement while Chaila is merely an 
obshchina, creating a village for Chaila represents a great challenge for the Yukagir people.7 
This preference for semi-sedentarization on the part of the Y ukagir is an outcome of Soviet 
nationalities policy. Second, that this form of self-government is only possible for those engaged 
in traditional native industries is problematic since the majority of the republic's natives no 
longer practice such activities. Future self-government arrangements should consider the native 
population as a whole. 
Activists proposed yet another piece of republican legislation on native self-government 
entitled "Suktuulye" (Yukag:ir for self-government).8 If this law is enacted, it will institutionalize 
non-native concepts of territoriality even more deeply among the Y ukagirs than did Soviet 
nationalities policy via the designation of set borders and sedentarization. This legislation is of 
an emergency nature and is designed to ensure the future development of this "disappearing 
people" by establishing territories for traditional native industries surrounding the two Y ukagir 
obshchinas mentioned above. As is now the case with local (non-native) self-governing units 
throughout Russia, this legislation would ensure funding directly to Yukagir obshchinas, 
bypassing the raion level. 9 Despite its approval by both chambers of parliament, President 
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Nikolayev rejected this legislation on the basis that he did not wish to award privileges on the 
basis of ethnic distinctions or to set precedent for other native groups. This setback represents a 
prolonged journey, rather than a dead end, on the road to native self-determination in Yakutia. 
Draft legislation on the status of indigenous peoples of this republic is also in progress. 10 
Nonetheless, the Sakha Republic is far ahead of Moscow and most other territorial-
administrative units within Russia in terms of aboriginal policy, 11 a testament of the will of many 
of the dominant society in Y akutia to help. 
In addition to those challenges uniquely encountered in the struggle for aboriginal self-
government, natives also face several of the same obstacles as other forms of local (non-native) 
self-government throughout Russia. First, raion-level administrations tend to resist challenges to 
their power base, whether from native or non-native units of self-government. 12 Second, because 
self-government means self-financing, local government means nothing without finances. 
Another unique obstacle to native self-government regards its perceived challenge to the 
power base of local (non-native) governments. Many contest native self-government based on 
the fear of provoking a domino effect among native claimants, as well as on inconsistencies with 
both pending federal legislation and laws that already exist with the law on local (non-native) 
self-government. The challenge of the state is to balance the interests of the northern minorities 
and those ofthe region's non-native newcomers and thus represents a great threat in that native 
peoples will suffer if the most they can achieve are equal rights and opportunities.13 
The regional level is equally affected by some of the factors which define local level 
concerns and organization. Organization at this level has resulted in two different forms of 
ethnic mobilization among natives: inter-ethnic relations and intra-ethnic relations. Examples of 
the former include the regional associations that incorporate several different native groups (i.e. 
raion or republic associations of the peoples of the North, congress of Y akutia' s nomadic tribal 
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obschinas). 14 The latter involves the gathering of peoples of the same aboriginal ethnicity 
together at the regional level, such as occurred at the congresses held for each of the republic ' s 
native groups. 15 Regional intra-ethnic relations remain limited by the geographic boundaries 
introduced during the Soviet era, separating members of one native group from their ethnic 
counterparts outside ofYakutia's borders. Groups outside the republic ' s borders will be affected 
by other state policies concerning native self-government, or lack thereof. 
The state's response to indigenous bids for greater autonomy at the regional level is 
noteworthy. One was the establishment of the Eveno-Bytantaisky raion in August of 1989 (see 
Figure 3.2, unit 33). This was the first national raion to be re-established since their abolition in 
the 1930s.16 The Even lobby, which began in 1988,17 sent a message to the Yakutia's indigenes 
about the impact local activism could have on state planners. 18 This raion not only achieved the 
right of veto concerning all development within its boundaries, but the state agreed to protect the 
right of Evens to their traditional way of Iife. 19 Evens also assume top leadership positions in 
this raion, 20 which was not always the case in national raions of the 1930s. 
Ethnic mobilization at the regional level succeeded with the introduction of native 
language instruction to the education curriculum for smaller groups (i.e. Yukagirs) in 1989.21 
Many natives perceive language issues as critical in the process of cultural revival. For instance, 
Gavril Kurilov, a renowned Yukagir writer pen named Uluro Ado, equates the loss of a nation' s 
language with the downfall of that nation. 22 Despite enthusiasm, demands for native language 
schooling were limited by the deficiency of teachers who are knowledgeable23 and teaching 
materials (i.e. textbooks) in these languages. The Yukagir language was among the first to start 
disappearing.24 In 1989, of a total population of 1,100, only 200 could speak Yukagir (150 
spoke Tundra and 50 spoke Forest Yukagir).25 The limited knowledge of native languages and 
cultures warns of cultural elements that will be lost with the passing on of elders. 26 
73 
In the areas of education and research, a college for indigenous peoples has been founded 
in Cherskii to promote indigenous cultures, as have programs on the culture and languages of the 
Evenks, Evens and Yukagirs at Yakutsk State Universit/7 and the Institute for Northern 
Minorities' Problems.28 This Institute's legal department works closely with the Committees on 
Indigenous Peoples from both houses of parliament and consults with the Department of 
Northern Minorities/9 and is largely responsible for drafting legislation on the republic's natives. 
These institutions contribute to indigenous mobilization by facilitating their political 
organization and by preparing the next generation for their political roles via academic training. 
As modem aboriginal claims stem from the same quest for self-determination that serves 
as the legitimating basis for the world's sovereign states, natives also feel entitled to some 
degree of autonomy over their territory. 30 As Vitebsky explains, "the desire for ecological 
control of one's own landscape and economic control of its natural resources were translated 
into the classic Soviet idiom of territoriality. "31 Indeed, the concept of territoriality that 
differentiates local and regional levels of political organization from the nationwide, since the 
political concessions sought at the nationwide level are rooted not in affiliation to concrete 
communities, but in aboriginal status. 32 
Soviet regional and nationalities policies markedly overlapped, an inherent relationship 
which carried over into the Russian Federation. This overlap encouraged aboriginal 
development within Yak:utia in terms of both the spin-off effects of Yakutia's status as a 
resource-rich republic and the relationship between its natives and the republican government. 
Though indigenous mobilization coincided with Moscow's power struggle with the regions, it 
was only after the Soviet collapse that relations between the Sakha Republic government and 
local natives would foster aboriginal development within the region. Indeed, the former 
progression encouraged the latter. 
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Achievement of collective goals hinges both on mobilization from below and on positive 
responses from above. This entails not only the will, but the capacity, of the government to 
change. The relative advantage in which the Salcha Republic currently finds itself is largely due 
to its tremendous natural resource-base and to the new-found power associated with its republic 
status. As Poelzer notes, "[ d]ormant under the firm hand of the Party the federal structures of 
the former Soviet state today have come to life. "33 That this republic is an ethnic entity itself 
seems to have meant greater receptivity to the demands of its aboriginal population. Gains made 
in the power struggle with Moscow, while driven by Sakha nationalism, would indirectly benefit 
local natives. For instance, Yakutia's nomadic natives received usufruct rights in the December 
1992 Law on the Nomadic Tribal Obshchina when the republican government introduced them 
as "playing cards" to both secure republican ownership and protection of mineral-rich lands and 
block secession by its Russian-dominated raions. 34 
Moscow came to award the republic special privileges based on its status as a resource-
rich republic. For whatever reasons, Yeltsin devolved powers to the republic. Between 1992 
and 1995 a series of agreements with Moscow permitted the republic 32% of all diamond 
profits, control of 20% of gem quality diamonds, direct relations with foreign governments and 
companies, 35 provisional holding of federal taxes, 36 15% of gold profits, 37 distribution of profits, 
and allocation of taxes. 38 These agreements also permitted the joint-stock company "Taba" to 
market abroad. Established to attract hard currency to the republic, this company purchases 
produce from agricultural natives for re-sale. Though it has helped to secure markets for such 
products, it has compromised natives by several times forfeiting on payments owed them. 39 
The republican government encouraged foreign investment in the region, especially 
where it concerned the extraction of diamonds, gold, and other minerals, as well as oil, and 
timber. 40 As the republic profits from foreign investment, natives fear that foreign exploitation 
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merely substitutes that by Moscow and that the pace of industrial development will be stepped 
up. On the positive side, however, the concessions noted above may have opened the way for 
profit re-distribution to regions hit hardest by development (refer to Figure 2.1 ). 4 1 As previously 
mentioned, the republic 's regional economic growth translates into various programs which 
benefit local indigenes. These programs foster indigenous mobilization, thus calling into 
question the ethnic competition tenet that an ethnic group must be relatively wealthy to mobilize. 
While all four models tend to view the relative wealth of the sub-nation in monetary terms, 
consideration should extend to also include those sources of wealth and financial support to 
which they have access and from which they benefit (i.e. state grants, subsidies). 
While the republican government has the capacity to foster aboriginal development in 
Yakutia, the will necessary to make this happen must be more than a mere statement of intent-- it 
requires dedication. Only actions can serve as a measure of its commitment to this goal. While 
some actions by the republic's government and president have ameliorated the situation for the 
republic's natives, other action and inaction on their part have at times worked against them. 
The remainder of this section assesses republican actions on both sides of this political scale. 
With the division of powers within the Russian Federation, fears abounded that regional 
governments would duplicate state actions vis-a-vis northern natives. Indeed, when the public 
perceives an inordinate amount of favoritism towards natives, this is often the case. 42 Just as the 
Soviet government abolished institutions directed specifically at natives, so to did the Sakha 
Republic government abolish the Ministry of Northern Minorities ' Affairs and transferred 
similar responsibilities to a new, smaller department within the Ministry of Peoples' Affairs. 
The department's shortage of staff, severely limited budget, and somewhat unclear mandate 
impede the effectiveness of this administrative organ.43 The republic has also duplicated state 
policy in compelling hunters and herders to sell their produce to joint-stock companies (i.e. 
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"Taba", "Sakhabult") for fixed prices too low to permit recovery of production costs.44 Because 
regional governments tend to act in a similar fashion as the center, natives have learned not to 
rely solely on one level of government. This has shaped mobilization strategies in that Yakutia 's 
native groups have set multiple targets for political action-- local, raion, republic, and 
nationwide. 
The Sakha Republic is breaking the mold typical of indigenous-state relations of the 
Soviet era in fostering aboriginal development. It shares joint federal sponsorship of a five-year 
Program for the Preservation and Revival of Indigenous Peoples, and has introduced a program 
for native social and economic development.45 President Nikolayev has even sponsored the 
congresses of Yakutia's indigenous groups held since 1992 from his "cultural fund" and has 
helped to establish another fund aimed at protecting territories reserved for nomadic 
cornmunities.46 The republic has also assisted with the purchase of mobile meat processing 
equipment for natives of the six northernmost raions,47 with subsidies of clothing and 
equipment,48 and with a recent resolution for state support of traditional industries, subsistence 
and social protection of rural natives within its twelve northernmost raions. 49 It also established 
a pension fund for reindeer herders and tent workers (chumrabotnitsiy).5° For these and other 
reasons, the relationship between the Sakha and the republic' s native peoples may, to some 
extent, be changing from domination to facilitation. 
Ethnic Identity Formation: The Nationwide Level 
At the outset of the native movement in Russia, native peoples were in no position to mount any 
protest beyond "within-system" approaches due to the limitations of their non-titular status. 
They have adopted their distinct approach to ethnic organization and representation not only for 
this reason, but because "[g]roups drawing their membership from a particular culture . . . can be 
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expected to reflect that culture in their relations with the state."51 Pross notes that "[i]t is 
common . . . for groups representing these communities to reject conventional hierarchical 
organizational structures in favour of arrangements that promote full member participation and 
consensus-seeking in decision-making. "52 Approaches to reformulating indigenous identities 
and boundary markers, than, can also work within the current political system. 
The first signs of Moscow's responsiveness to native concerns came in 1989 with the 
establishment of the State Commission on Arctic Affairs. This agency recommended a 
"Congress of Representatives of Native Peoples of the North" and a body to represent northern 
peoples' interests at all levels.53 While the Soviet era forged an aboriginal identity at the 
nationwide level, native representatives first asserted this identity in founding the Association of 
Numerically Small Peoples of the North at the first national native congress held in March of 
1990.54 Goble claims that native peoples formed this association in response to the 
establishment of the new Arctic Administration, 55 perhaps viewing this agency as a potential 
threat The many threats which face natives provided adequate incentive for indigenous leaders 
to undertake such an unprecedented initiative. That ethnic mobilization occurred in response to 
these threats upholds the ethnic sub-nationalism view. Indeed, a national native association 
would help reformulate indigenous-state relations within Russia and bolster the bargaining 
positions of these minorities. It could facilitate discussions of native concerns and future 
developments at the nationwide level, while receiving input through the regional and local 
branches of the Association of Small Peoples of the North. 
While local and regional organizations were fostered by state agencies and for state 
purposes, this national organization was spearheaded by indigenous elites. Nevertheless, state 
policies did incite ethnic mobilization at the nationwide level. The fact that native peoples were 
categorized as a single legal entity meant that members of different aboriginal groups received 
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the same treatment by the state in terms of education, employment, etc. Although this explains 
why different aboriginal peoples would want to exchange ideas, how this became possible may 
be explained in terms of yet other state policies: those which forced natives to learn and use the 
Russian language in their day to day functions and that which promoted the aboriginal media 
(i.e. books, newspapers, radio, etc.), in terms of both technical support and funding. Common 
knowledge of the Russian language meant that natives throughout Russia would eventually be 
able to express their ideas and frustrations to one another and to use this as their language of 
communication in working towards change. The institutionalization of the aboriginal press also 
helped in terms of gaining media experience and reinforcing aboriginal identities. Russia's 
indigenous peoples are united by these common experiences. That ethnic competition is an 
outcome of various state policies supports the ethnic competition view. 
The ethnic mobilization of native peoples is not a manifestation of primordial 
sentiments~ rather, it is a process involving both the emergence of new ethno-political actors and 
group interests born of modem state-building processes. Indigenous ethnic mobilization within 
Russia is emergent rather than resurgent, the former term used to describe that which occurs 
among "formerly separate, even factious, and often culturally diverse groups. "56 The processes 
of modern state-building and modernization entailed therein have united all of these diverse 
peoples together in one group, even if it does not represent a single, unified group. Mobilization 
reinforced the ethnic identities created under Soviet rule and enhanced the opportunity structure 
for sustaining ethnic mobilization. That native peoples have come together in one group, even if 
not unified, is advantageous, since divisions between and even within groups might otherwise 
hinder indigenous development. 57 Poelzer identifies its other blessing: "Supratribal [nationwide] 
organization serves as a surrogate for nationalism among peoples of disparate language groups 
and cultural areas."58 
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Changes that have occurred with respect to indigenous ethnic identity formation and self-
organization constitute a discontinuity in ethnic boundary maintenance in terms of the 
organizational structures and actors employed in such maintenance. While it may be true that 
aboriginal groups are constrained by the identities created for them by the Soviet government, a 
shift did take place whereby aboriginal groups would begin to gain greater control over and to 
re-define their own ethnic identities. As in the past, such flexibility of identities and boundaries 
will determine the abilities of indigenous peoples to accommodate change in the future. 
Indigenous Mobilization as Means and End: Redefining Identities and Boundaries 
Due both to those policies specific to indigenous peoples (i .e. their own judicial system, special 
agencies) and to the unique implications for natives of yet other uniformly-applied policies (i.e. 
amalgamation), state policies have uniquely influenced indigenous mobilization in four key 
areas: ethnic identities, collective goals, political resources, and strategies. 
First, it shaped the way indigenous peoples in Russia think about their ethnic identity in a 
unique fashion. Native identities exist at multiple levels-- kin, clan, tribal, village, raion, 
republic, and nationwide-- which often overlap. Because native identities are also situational, 
they can be activated in different situations and for different purposes. 59 For instance, a native 
may identify him/ herself as an Evenk in relations with the state or with dominant nationalities, 
but may identify him/ herself as a member of a particular clan upon meeting another Evenk. 
That Yakutia is itself an ethnic identity signifies the common ground shared between 
local natives and the Sakha as non-Russian peoples and has evoked empathy from the republic's 
titular group. These groups together have, to some extent, formed a "community of interests" 
based on certain cultural markers and symbols recognizable to, and expected of, each other. 60 
Shared perceptions between the groups permit mutual understanding in their social relations and 
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on occasiOns where they pursue common ends. The support of members of the Sakha 
intelligentsia in particular has bolstered the position of local natives. These factors have affected 
aboriginal development differently in the Sakha Republic than in Russia's lower-level units. 
It is social relations based on ties of interest that make for the social cohesion required 
for the success of ethnic mobilization. These relations are determined according to the logic of 
segmentary oppositions, a system of social interaction based on concentric circles of alliance and 
opposition that determine degrees of inside- and outsideness.6 1 The strength of social relations 
can be placed along a continuum, strongest at the level of kinship, and then progressively 
diminishing in significance-- i.e. kin, clan, community, one's own native group, other native 
groups, other ethnic groups with similar interests, social movements with similar interests, and 
onwards. In Yakutia, social cohesion results both from ties of interests within and between 
native groups, as well as from those they share with the Sakha. Such ties are neither as extensive 
nor seem to promote indigenous mobilization to the same extent within lower-level units. 
The second consequence of Soviet policy for indigenous mobilization is that the political 
goals pursued are unique from those of Russia's other ethnic groups. The goals which drive 
indigenous mobilization are both instrumental and expressive. That is, it concurrently uses 
ethnicity as a tool in competing for resources and seeks both attitudinal and value 
transformations and the reformulation of group identities. These goals emanated from the 
indigenous experience vis-a-vis Soviet nationalities policy. The pursuit of value transformations 
and reformulations of group identities defies the imposition of ideas, values, identities and 
boundaries of these peoples "from above". Instead, the goals pursued by indigenous groups are 
unique in that they typically involve within-system approaches, and seek influence rather than 
power. The political drive which sustains ethnic mobilization, "far from being the means to an 
end, is actually the very condition enabling a group of people to think and act in terms of the 
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means-end category. "62 Indeed, indigenous mobilization is both the means to an end and the end 
in itself. 
The third aspect of indigenous mobilization which Soviet policy has shaped is the 
political resources used in the struggle for greater native self-determination. A conducive 
political environment is not sufficient for indigenous mobilization- resources must also be 
available and used effectively. Political resources are the means available to promote a group' s 
cause or course of action, thus enhancing its likelihood of achieving its goals. Resources may 
include land, money, the size of a group' s constituency, legal expertise, administrative 
experience and skilled leadership. As an ongoing process, ethnic mobilization should not be 
viewed simply as the collection of assets that are used towards some larger goal, but as a cyclical 
process in which the accumulation of such experience constitutes a valuable end. In other 
words, mobilization is both a means to an end (greater self- detennination) and that end itself. 
As aboriginal peoples generally have few direct resources (i.e. legal skills, numbers), they 
must rely largely upon mobilizational resources (i.e. organization, social cohesion, leadership, 
and education). The greater their convertibility, reusability and broad applicability, the more 
valuable resources are.63 For instance, that money may be converted into resources such as 
education or legal skills and applied in the mobilization process in a number of ways heightens 
its value as a political resource; however, that it is not reusable may also limit its value. 
Affirmative action too is a convertible resource in that it may be parlayed into both education 
and relevant political skills. 
Native peoples possess several resources upon which they rely in their ethnic 
mobilization, several of which are unintended outcomes of Soviet nationalities policy: territories, 
administrations, and skilled political leadership. One of the most important is territory, for this 
is the connection between the past, present and future for these peoples. As indigenous peoples 
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in Yakutia long predated the Sakha and the Russians and as many native groups did receive their 
own territorial-administrative units in the early Soviet years, they have a well-grounded 
precedent for the re-establishment of their own ethnic territories. Even though national 
territories have been abolished, the collective memory of their existence remains a powerful 
force in indigenous mobilization and shapes the political goals of indigenous peoples (to once 
again achieve special territorial rights). 
The acquisition of any resources that increase the capacity of natives to govern 
themselves enhances their prospects for greater self-determination. Self-government depends 
upon the continuing acquisition of resources, including allocative resources such as 
administrations. Native groups acquired administrative resources not only during their brief 
term as third-order titular nationalities, but via their involvement in local (and mostly rural) 
councils throughout the Soviet era. Native administrative capacities facilitate the continuance of 
indigenous mobilization. 
Skilled political leadership advances indigenous mobilization, native leaders having 
gained their experience during the Soviet era through the education system and the promotion of 
native elites (national cadres).64 Native elites were drawn from among high profile figures such 
as writers and academics. Both Vladimir Sangi and Y eremei Aipin, founding and current 
presidents of the nationwide Association of Small Peoples, are writers. Vasily Robbeck, an 
Even and the director of the Institute for Northern Minorities' Problems in Yakutsk, is a linguist 
by training. Anatoly Afonaseyevich Alekseyev, an Even, is a former head of his village of 
Sebyan Kyuyol' in Yakutia and is now an activist and scholar affiliated with both Yakutsk State 
University and the Sakha-American Business Educational Centre. Native leaders were drawn 
from the same occupations as leaders of other ethnic movements within Russia rather than from 
such persons as would have occupied leadership positions in pre-Soviet years. This change 
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attests to the degree of integration which some aboriginal peoples have undergone and supports 
the ethnic sub-nationalism model. With fewer well-educated native leaders in disadvantaged 
regions, a greater burden is placed upon these few individuals to effect change. That many 
regions within the Russian North are without institutions of higher learning greatly limits both 
the opportunities available to and, by implication, mobilizational capacities of, natives in these 
regions. The greater relative success of indigenous mobilization in Yakutia may be due, in part, 
to the distribution of a number of post-secondary institutions throughout the republic. This 
facilitates the development of leadership capabilities among native students and requires native 
students to travel smaller distances for their education. 
Some developments at the micro-level that could benefit native groups are dependent 
upon state motives and native bargaining resources. As the state often ensures that it has 
something to gain by helping its natives, be it land, resources, services, furs, food, certain rights 
or exemptions, or even reinforcement of state legitimacy, bargaining resources require that a 
group has a legitimate claim to, or degree of control over, such resources, and that these are in 
demand by the state. 65 This was the case when the Sakha Republic affirmed ownership of its 
territory subject to a potential secessionist movement by the region' s Russian population by 
advocating the legal establishment of self-governing nomadic communities in the region 
(previously mentioned).66 The greater relative success of indigenous mobilization in Yakutia 
than elsewhere in Russia may be due, in part, to the greater access Yakutia' s natives have to 
bargaining resources and, in part, to the tendency of lower-level territorial-administrative units to 
avoid taking action against nationalist outbursts by local Russians. The most important 
bargaining resource distinguishing indigenous groups from other ethnic groups in Russia is 
aboriginal status. This legal foundation for aboriginal claims has been critical in the relative 
success of indigenous mobilization in Russia. 
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The fourth consequence of Soviet policy for indigenous mobilization is the political 
strategy employed in this process. While governmental control of resources and specification of 
rules of access and allocation affect the timing and degree of ethnic mobilization, the extent of 
its success is also dependent upon the organizational structures and dynamics employed in 
collective struggles. Soviet nationalities policy generated the organizational factors which 
sustain the process of indigenous mobilization and the re-formation and maintenance of ethnic 
boundaries therein. 
Collective goals can influence the level of member participation sought and the strategies 
adopted. While centralized, hierarchical structures can effect institutional change more rapidly, 
such organizational forms are not always preferred. Because native peoples seek grass-roots 
participation, they tend to prefer decentralized structures which allow for greater involvement. 
However, as neither organizational form is alone effective in achieving both instrumental and 
expressive goals, natives seek a compromise between the two. Indeed, they have directed their 
efforts at influencing multiple levels of government, thereby decreasing their chances of total 
failure . As indigenous identities are multiple, this strategy permits action at all levels. The 
ethnic networks developed under Soviet policy fostered communication, organization, and 
leadership skills among members, as well as incited group coherence and "facilitate mobilization 
by providing precarious organizational bases from which more complex forms of organization 
can develop. '.67 
The roles played by, and abilities of, group leaders are indispensable in determining the 
organizational structures employed in ethnic mobilization.68 Leaders' roles can vary depending 
upon the stage of organization attained. They are most heavily involved during the initiation 
phase. As formal or complex organizations generally become the carriers of ethnic movements 
beyond this stage, the task of determining indigenous goals, strategy, and tactics are generally 
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carried out by such organizations (i.e. the Association of Small Peoples).69 "Once they have 
survived the first round in the game of positional politics, groups tend to become less vocal , less 
inclined to invoke public opinion."70 This need not be the case, for as ethnic mobilization is an 
ongoing process and as the challenges facing non-state peoples are continually emerging, so too 
should the efforts of native leaders persist. The Association of Small Peoples of Yakutia holds 
an office in the republic 's Department of Northern Minorities, suggesting the institutionalization 
of relations between the two bodies and increasing the likelihood of effecting change. 
"[I]t is leaderships, not people, who inherit old switchboards and palaces."71 Ethnic 
mobilization's success depends largely upon leaders' abilities. Since members of the aboriginal 
elite and intelligentsia were in a position to instigate indigenous mobilization and had acquired 
considerable experience under Soviet rule, they have played critical roles in promoting native 
agendas. It was those who some consider to be "old school" elites that assumed these roles, an 
analogy that is often misused, for many native representatives acquired their positions in 
government as a result of indigenous activism, not in spite of it. 72 Many elites underwent a 
cultural revival, retreating from politics with the Soviet collapse and resurfacing some time later 
to push the native agenda. This was the experience of Andrey Krivoshapkin, former Soviet 
deputy for the Yakut ASSR who, after retiring from political life, again became inspired by the 
revivalist spirit within Yakutia.73 He is currently a deputy in the upper house of the republic's 
parliament, the president of the Association of Small Peoples of the North of Y akutia, and an 
occasional representative of the Sakha Republic in Moscow. His case highlights the need for 
aboriginal specialists, as many are under pressure to take on multiple positions of leadership. 
Ethnic movements, at the outset, generally do not involve the broad masses of people nor 
their immediate interests. Sentiments supporting ethnic mobilization are "mobilized largely 
after the fact and always in a language of self-defence."74 If this is true, whose interests does 
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ethnic mobilization serve? Many indigenes perceive leadership at the regional and national 
levels to be out of touch with the most crucial issues they face,75 as leaders have failed to address 
their basic survival needs and have made only moderate attempts to gain local input and to 
communicate with upper-level associations. The constituency of the Association of Small 
Peoples of the North is divided over the personalities of leaders, the misuse of power by regional 
representatives, and ethnic grudges over relative advantage and access to power. 76 Aboriginal 
leaders must work to resolve these problems for, as the ethnic sub-nationalism model predicts, 
ethnic mobilization' s success is dependent upon the ability of the elite to secure support from the 
general population. 
The slowness to change and red tape left over from the Soviet era has hindered effective 
leadership and limited the national aboriginal association to "advisory status". 77 The new system 
also presents changes. With the abolition of guaranteed minority representation, the number of 
natives in the Sakha Republic' s parliament dropped from eleven before 1992 to just three 
today. 78 Ethnic mobilization also effects change at a slow pace due to its weak legal basis and 
lack of legal expertise as supported native claims in North America. Transportation and 
communication problems impede the input of rural indigenes into the association's national and 
regional levels. 
Whether due to internal or external factors, if leaders fail to achieve their mandate or 
"the express assignment of representative capacity to a group's leadership by its membership",79 
then no longer is what they say considered the legitimate expression of the group by its 
members. If their mandate is withdrawn the legitimacy of the leadership and, consequently, that 
of the association, is degraded 80 That several representatives of the nationwide association 
claimed it to be the only group with the "juridical and moral right" to represent Russia's 
indigenes at the 1995 sessions of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Affairs, may 
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have put them in bad favor with the other participating groups from Russia and in bad public 
light generally. "There have been some that have anticipated new thinking and that have 
undergone substantial changes, but as a rule these are the ones with least access to power. "81 
Obstacles to achieving successful indigenous mobilization are, to some degree, rooted in 
organizational flaws. While the political structures imposed upon indigenous society during the 
Soviet era appear to have replaced kinship as their key ordering mechanism, native self-
government legislation in the Sakha Republic has the capacity to reinforce kinship. Reinforcing 
traditional elements, in tum, strengthens aboriginal identities and enhances the opportunity 
structure for continuing mobilization. By recognizing the obshchina as the fundamental unit of 
political organization, it seems that republican law recognizes the endurance of traditional kin-
based orders and land-use systems. This administrative unit is likely to become the most basic 
level of aboriginal identity for those engaged in traditional industries. That lower-level 
administrative units have not acted in a similar capacity has, in contrast, limited native 
capacities. 
Low levels of activity of, and participation in, aboriginal associations also hinder ethnic 
mobilization. This seems to be less a problem in the Sakha Republic than elsewhere. 82 Once 
indigenous peoples become directly involved in making decisions that govern their own lives, 
this situation will likely change to improve prospects for aboriginal development. Aboriginal 
peoples face the common challenge of securing grassroots support for the indigenous elite, a 
challenge which is even greater when faced with low social cohesion within a group. In the 
Sakha Republic, native elites have been able to secure the support of the lower strata of 
indigenous society because the actions of the former have corresponded with the needs of group 
members. The same cannot always be said of cross-class relations in many other regions of 
Russia. The ethnic sub-nationalism model holds that ethnic mobilization necessitates opposition 
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to the political center which cuts across classes; however, this seems to be only partially true 
here. While such cross-class social cohesion is necessary for the success of an ethnic movement, 
it is not required for its initiation, as the many instances of indigenous mobilization in such 
lower-level administrative units demonstrate. 
Soviet nationalities policy molded the identities and capacities of native peoples and 
occasioned the specific endogenous processes that affected mobilization. Just as macro-political 
variables have done, micro-political variables contributed to the relative success of indigenous 
development in Yakutia, in terms of the greater receptivity to, and relative success of, aboriginal 
demands. This may have ramifications for indigenous-state relations: aboriginal peoples may 
perceive the likelihood of receiving concessions from an ethnic republic, when applicable, as 
greater than from either lower-level administrative units or Moscow. These trends are likely to 
intensify already uneven patterns of aboriginal development in Russia. 
The situation in Soviet Russia has inversely changed to one where ethnicity manifests 
itself in various ways, permitting the redefinition of collective identities and the ethnic 
mobilization vital to struggles for self-determination. It is both through, and as an outcome of, 
these processes that aboriginal peoples are regaining control of their own ethnic boundaries. If 
members of an ethnic group agree that certain roles can be fulfilled by each of its members then 
ethnicity is self-fulfilling unless the resources needed to perform these roles are not uniformly 
distributed. 83 In the· case that these resources are gained or lost in ways independent of being 
indigenous, some natives would obviously be left unable to act in the roles traditionally expected 
of them (i.e. as reindeer herders, hunters, fishers). Soviet nationalities policy ensured that indeed 
this was the case; however, as "pariah minorities", the state's need for the services expected of 
indigenes meant that it could not eliminate traditional native industries altogether.84 For many 
indigenous peoples in post-Soviet Russia, this still constitutes an entire way of life; for others, its 
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effect on their everyday lives is more symbolic than real. Not only are they not familiar with the 
activities necessary to fulfill these roles, but many do not even desire to return to such a lifestyle. 
Nevertheless, the symbolic importance of traditional indigenous life ways remains critical . 
While indigenous identities may have been ascriptive throughout most of the Soviet era, 
this changed upon realization of the conditions necessary for indigenous mobilization. At this 
time, the strategic utility of ethnic identities became apparent with competition for the resources 
necessary to achieve collective goals. Soviet nationalities policy was the springboard by which 
natives could live out their identities in new ways and for new purposes-- contributing to ethnic 
mobilization and to the reformation and maintenance of ethnic boundaries. Ethnic identity can 
be used to perform new activities, to develop new positions, and to occupy sectors either poorly 
developed or not formerly found within traditional aboriginal society. 85 Ethnic identities can 
thus be self-fulfilling, the performance of ethnic categories reinforcing native identities. 86 
Many aboriginal peoples, both rural and urban, desire to return to life ways in which 
survival may be possible without having to rely on the state. Indeed, the problems this thesis 
outlines indicate that one cannot rely solely on the state. Native society within Russia has 
witnessed the presentation of several alternatives to doing so. "Self-help" initiatives and the 
multi-tiered approach to indigenous mobilization currently employed contribute to such efforts. 
It is through these processes that aboriginal peoples may become "gatekeepers" for their own 
boundaries. Defying the Soviet logic that they are incapable of making their own decisions and 
of seeing them through, Russia' s native peoples are doing just this and coming to realize the 
responsibility that must be achieved if they are to be successful. 87 It is likely that aboriginal 
peoples will embrace such responsibility if it holds the promise of the control over resources they 
require and if, in fact, the struggle for self-determination cannot be won without it. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Indigenous Mobilization: Taking Ethnic Mobilization Theory to a New Frontier 
Just as there i~ a reaction for every action, exogenous developments influence those that are 
internal to ethnic groups. In the case of Soviet nationalities policy, the state not only constructed 
the kiln in which indigenous ethnic identities and capacities hardened, but while generating a 
deep resentment towards the state, it simultaneously armed Russia's natives with the firepower 
to do something about it. These outcomes of Soviet nationalities policy set the stage for the 
indigenous reaction-- ethno-political mobilization. 
The aim of this chapter is twofold: to explain how both external and internal variables 
and processes affect the success of indigenous mobilization and to demarcate the contributions 
of this study to the study of ethno-political mobilization. It first contrasts the realities of our case 
study with existing theories on ethnic mobilization and endeavors to expand upon the ethnic sub-
nationalism perspective. It then highlights the contributions this study makes to the study of 
ethnic mobilization and finally, proposes several related areas for further investigation. 
The Three Pioneering Models of Ethnic Mobilization Theory: Applicability and Limitations 
Of the four perspectives on ethno-political mobilization, the developmental, reactive ethnicity 
and ethnic competition perspectives are familiar to students of ethnicity. This section 
determines their applicability vis-a-vis the indigenous peoples of Y akutia by contrasting the 
empirical realities of this case with the various theoretical components comprising each of these 
models. This examination prepares the way for the introduction of the fourth, lesser known 
approach-- the ethnic sub-nationalism perspective-- which comprises the next section. 
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The four models differ in their reasoning about the roots of ethnic mobilization. The 
developmental perspective holds that such mobilization is likely to occur only if a culturally 
distinct, peripheral region remains outside of the national economy and polity, if the economic, 
political and cultural gap between the center and periphery widens, and if the channels for 
securing representation remain inaccessible to the ethnic group. While the reactive ethnicity 
perspective accedes to the former's view of the ideal typical cultural minority for ethnic 
mobilization, this view propounds that ethnic mobilization results from the particularistic 
allocation of valued roles and resources to members of dominant nationalities. The ethnic 
competition perspective, on the other hand, argues that mobilization is caused by some form of 
structurally-based provocation which increases ethnic competition by re-organizing the 
distribution of new political roles, rewards or resources among varied ethnic groups. 
All of these perspectives agree that modernization and contact with the dominant society 
erode the distinctiveness of ethnic identities but differ in their assessment of the implications of 
this for ethnic mobilization. In the developmental model, these processes lead to assimilation 
and diminish the likelihood of mobilization. Because ethnic cleavages give way to functional 
(i.e. class-based) cleavages, the two are deemed incompatible. The reactive ethnicity and ethnic 
competition models, in contrast, argue that structural differentiation and ethnic affiliations may 
be compatible. In the former model, the particularistic allocation of resources disadvantages the 
minority group as a whole, ethnic and class interests are mutually reinforcing and allows for both 
the preservation of ethnic identities in modem societies and the ethnic mobilization that occurs 
when class interests finally give way to ethnic interests. The ethnic competition model 
challenges this in that ethnic interests may predominate even among class-divided groups. 
Although various macro-social processes (i.e. modem state-building processes) eroded 
many cultural features distinguishing native peoples from other ethnic groups, those that have 
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been retained are still significant. State policies set the stage for indigenous mobilization by 
enforcing social segregation; however, this cannot be equated to isolation per se. While the 
Soviet administration did not fully integrate indigenous peoples into the national economy, it did 
I 
happen to some extent. Though there is some support for this tenet of the developmental 
perspective, it is limited by the fact that a widening of the cultural, political or economic gap 
between these peoples and the center did not occur. To be forthright, this gap was already pretty 
wide to begin with, not to mention that the Soviet system did improve their standard of living. 
While representative channels were not available to natives, this was the case for most ethnic 
minorities during the Soviet era. 1 Thus, this fact does not explain why mobilization occurs, for 
many such groups did not mobilize along ethnic lines when their opportunity came to do so. 
The suppositions of the reactive ethnicity model fall even further from the mark in that 
while some privileges of titular groups were denied natives, others conferred to the latter were 
denied the former. The state gave native groups special treatment and benefits such as funding, 
territories and administrations, quotas for education and employment, and popular media. While 
grievances did exist, these alone were not sufficient to warrant ethno-political mobilization. 
The tenets of the ethnic competition perspective correspond to the case study of this 
thesis. Glasnost' and other reforms represent the structurally-based provocation which caused 
the re-distribution of political roles and rewards in Soviet Russia and heightened competition 
among its constituent nationalities. As this and the ethnic sub-nationalism models concur on the 
key cause of ethnic mobilization, this latter model comprises the focus of the following section. 
The developmental model attributes ethnic mobilization to the "possible residues of 
peripheral cultural traditionalism". 2 In the reactive etlulicity view, it occurs as a backlash to the 
unequal resource distribution modernization generates. In the ethnic competition model, in 
contrast, it results from structural change which reorganizes the distribution of political rewards. 
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Rokkan proposes that ethnic mobilization requires territorial concentration and socio-
economic isolation. 3 This supports only the developmental model for while the others acquiesce 
to the former, both dispute the latter. In the reactive ethnicity model, the dominant groups 
exploits the ethnic region and modernization engenders a cultural division of labor. This 
intensifies the link between social class and ethnicity and leads to mobilization either along 
ethnic- or class-based cleavages. If a group pursues the latter, yet fails, ethnic mobilization will 
likely still occur. The ethnic competition model argues that isolation actually hinders ethnic 
movements. While ethnic mobilization may still occur among isolated groups, isolation neither 
contributes to the success of ethnic mobilization nor is it a sufficient condition for mobilization. 4 
The ethnic competition view best fits the realities of Russia' s natives, for while new 
opportunities brought about the resource competition requisite for ethnic mobilization, native 
groups could not achieved success from a position of isolation. Indeed, natives with the least 
access to communication and transportation systems are the least likely to organize or mobilize 
along ethnic lines.5 Here, ethnic mobilization does not constitute a backlash to preferential 
treatment for, or infiltration by, dominant groups as in the reactive ethnicity model. Ethnic 
competition increases not with the cultural division of labor, but with its disruption.6 
Social isolation is not a critical variable to the success of ethnic mobilization for several 
reasons. First, while all perspectives admit that a strong linguistic base may enhance a group's 
opportunity structure, only the developmental holds that it enhances the likelihood of ethnic 
mobilization. Second, while cultural markers thrive in isolation, ethnic identities are forged and 
consolidated upon realization of one' s own ethnic distinctiveness. This cannot happen without 
exposure to peoples of other cultures whether through urbanization or villagization, cross-
cultural education, or media. Such contact is not only essential in strengthening ethnic 
identities, but magnifies political competition between ethnic groups as has occurred in Yakutia. 
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The three perspectives also differ over the implications of industrial development such as 
the occupational structure, relative wealth and economic status 7 of the typical ethnic group. The 
typical ethnic group for mobilization is engaged in agricultural industries in the developmental 
model and in industrial activities in the other two models. Minority members are typically poor 
in the developmental model and occupy a region which is declining economically. In the 
reactive ethnicity model, mobilization may still occur, even in the absence of economic growth 
or economic inequality, if an ethnic group perceives that there is.8 As Connor explains, " ... 
what ultimately matters is not what but what people believe is". 9 In both this and the ethnic 
competition models, ethnic mobilization is likely to occur among groups inhabiting stable or 
thriving regions. In the latter model, however, ethnic mobilization is most likely to occur among 
relatively affluent groups and whenever economic change (advance or decline) incites 
competition between contenders by restructuring political rewards and benefits. 
The case ofYakutia offers some support for the developmental model, as the majority of 
the native population remains rural and is engaged in agricultural industries. 10 Indigenous 
peoples are, on average, relatively poor11 and many reside in declining regions. 12 The reactive 
ethnicity perspective, in contrast, contends that the ethnic region is developed as an appendage to 
the national economy, its interests subordinated to national interests and capital siphoned from 
the ethnic group. This does not fit the case study, for were the region merely an extension of 
Moscow-centrism and national interests, it is likely that natives would neither have received 
their own territorial-administrative units nor any of the numerous privileges from which they 
benefited under the Soviet administration. While resources have generally been used as hard 
currency exports, the Sakha Republic has already begun to benefit from a changing situation, 
placing local indigenes at a growing advantage with respect to resource competition in 
comparison to Russia's other native and non-titular ethnic groups. This reahty supports the 
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ethnic competition perspective. Both Gorbachev' s reforms and the Soviet collapse were the 
mechanisms that triggered ethnic competition. The next section explores this point further. 
In the ethnic competition model, a group' s size is a key variable contributing to ethnic 
mobilization and holds that a group must be large enough to mount a substantial challenge to the 
center. The political sphere and the state expanded greatly in size throughout the modem state-
building process, thus altering the conditions of competition between groups and increasing the 
importance of large-scale identities. Neither of the other two views consider a group' s size to be 
a factor influencing ethnic mobilization nor do they make any predictions in these regards. 13 
Lessons from Indigenous Mobilization: An Extension of the Ethnic Sub-Nationalism Model 
The ethnic sub-nationalism model of ethnic mobilization is lesser-known than the others, 
perhaps due to its relative novelty. While the developmental and reactive ethnicity models focus 
primarily on why ethnic mobilization occurs, the ethnic competition model offers insight as to 
how it occurs. Although a derivation of this latter model, the ethnic sub-nationalism model 
attempts to explain both why and how ethnic mobilization is achieved. The extension of the 
ethnic sub-nationalism model this thesis offers support most tenets of the original, fine tuning 
others to incorporate the particulars of this case study. This section focuses upon the tenets 
where either the original ethnic sub-nationalism model or the extension I propose diverge from 
the ethnic competition model. 
In both the ethnic competition and ethnic sub-nationalism models, mobilization is likely 
to occur among groups that are not socially isolated. While mobilization may be more likely to 
occur among such groups, I argue that it may still occur among groups experiencing some degree 
of social isolation. To the extent that they are socially segregated, culturally marginalized, and 
engaged in a rural, agriculturally-based way of life, many natives are still relatively socially 
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isolated. 14 Relative social isolation affects the success of ethnic mobilization more than its 
genesis for while natives throughout Russia have mobilized, they enjoy varying degrees of 
success. Since relatively integrated groups sometimes demonstrate greater levels of ethnic 
awareness and activism than non-integrated groups and since even among group members, those 
most integrated into the dominant society seem more likely to support or lead ethno-political 
movements, relative social isolation does not contribute to the success of ethic mobilization. 15 
Integration not only roused natives to their own ethnic distinctiveness via contact with non-
natives, but allowed members of these subordinated groups to Jearn the language and 
maneuverings which permit success in the dominant society. State-sanctioned villagization and 
urbanization actually promoted the breakdown of social segregation to some extent. 
Language loss is another consequence of social integration over which the perspectives 
differ. The ethnic competition and ethnic sub-nationalism models challenge the developmental 
model that one's language plays a significant role in ethnic mobilization. While the former two 
models hold language to be of minor importance in such movements, such loss often constitutes 
a key force driving the struggle for indigenous self-determination. The mixed outcomes of state 
policy offer limited support to developmental and ethnic competition views. As such, the 
incorporation of ideas borrowed from the former view and from this case study is necessary to 
broaden the theoretical utility of the ethnic sub-nationalism model to also include native peoples. 
The ethnic sub-nationalism model upholds several tenets of the ethnic competition model 
regarding the impacts of industrial development and challenges others. In terms of an ethnic 
group's occupational structure, this model argues that mobilization may occur among groups 
employed in either agricultural or industrial activities.16 To the extent that employment in 
agricultural industries signifies relative isolation from the national economy, aboriginal peoples 
are also relatively socially isolated given the nature of the continuing native mixed economy. 
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The ethnic sub-nationalism model should account for the diverse occupational range of those 
who are likely to mobilize. Those who lead the native movement tend not to be engaged in 
agricultural activities and tend to live in urban areas where ethnic competition is more intense. 
While group affluence certainly does not hurt ethnic movements, I argue that 
mobilization may be as likely to occur among groups that are not wealthy. The initiation and 
success of indigenous mobilization in Russia attests to this. All four models are problematic in 
that they base the sub-nation's wealth solely on finances and thus, overlook other important 
political resources available to aboriginal groups. For instance, both the territories allocated to 
natives in the 1930s and the aboriginal status that entitled natives to claim lands and resources 
are important bargaining resources. Perhaps due to the exclusivity of such claims or to omission, 
existing models of ethnic mobilization do not address such resources. Also overlooked is the 
potential which may be achieved without mass financial resources. As natives generally have 
access to few finances, they have advanced their movement with mobilizational resources (i.e. 
education) and with direct resources (i.e. legal skills) acquired from other sources. As natives 
benefit from the Yakutia' s overall wealth (i.e. via subsidies, equipment), it is logical that models 
should address both resources possessed by, and available to, sub-nations. 
Although the ethnic competition and sub-nationalism models agree that ethnic 
mobilization is not as likely among groups inhabiting economic backwater areas, 17 both views 
yield to the possibility that it may occur in both declining and advancing regions. Because the 
former view argues that any change which restructures the system of rewards and resources is 
likely to provoke mobilization and the latter apply to any change which generates cross-class 
opposition to the center, regardless of the economic status of the region in which it takes place. 
Of all the regions of Russia in which indigenous mobilization has occurred, the greatest 
successes have been in regions of moderate economic status. In areas where the economy is 
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largely native, out-migration is evident and the need for "self-help" strategies is likely to be 
greatest. This means that, for many natives, there may be little alternative to partaking in the 
traditional native economy. In contrast, in economically thriving regions, there is a largely 
mixed population and securing state concessions for local natives depends upon the state's 
motives, the extent and capacities of local organization and leadership, and the degree to which a 
region is resource-rich. The state may be less likely to devolve power to native groups in highly 
developed regions, so as not to hinder industrial objectives, than it might in moderately 
developed regions. 18 Natives in these regions face the challenge of the mutual dependency 
between government and industry. 
While all four models view territorial concentration as a factor contributing to ethnic 
mobilization, this alone accounts for neither the initiation nor the success of indigenous 
mobilization. The ethnic sub-nationalism model may extend to indigenes in Russia and 
elsewhere19 if it conceded that groups likely to mobilize need not be territorially concentrated. 
Like the ethnic competition model, the ethnic sub-nationalism model propounds that 
modern ethnic mobilization can be either resurgent or emergent. It is emergent among Russia's 
natives, modernization bringing about an upwards shift in the size of the largest level of 
indigenous identity20 while small-scale identities remained intact. This upwards shift came 
about with the realization that different native groups could cooperate to achieve common goals, 
thus enhancing the prospects for collective resource mobilization. This is not to say that 
resource competition does not also exist between individual aboriginal groups. Rather than 
supplanting local with large-scale identities, the overlapping nature of indigenous identities 
reinforced local level identities (i.e. clan, ethnic group) and ties (i.e. based on kinship, 
community). This resulted both through mobilizational efforts at the upper levels and via local-
level resource competition between neighboring communities. It is precisely because of the 
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mutually reinforcing nature of these various levels of organization that Russia' s indigenous 
peoples employ a multi-tiered strategy in their struggle for self-determination. 
Indigenous peoples have not only mobilized but have witnessed success in various parts 
of Russia, thus raising doubts about the ethnic competition view that the ethnic group must be 
large enough to confront (oppose, bargain with, secure resources from) the state.21 While 
numbers contribute to ethnic mobilization when and where disruption is important (i.e. protests, 
electoral politics), numbers are less important in the manifestations of ethnic mobilization for 
native groups (i.e. membership and participation in ethnic organizations). While a large 
constituency certainly does not harm a group' s position, this case study demonstrates that non-
state peoples need not be large in size in order to exercise their effect on the state. This, again, 
will depend on the motives that drive ethnic movements. 
The key factor differentiating the ethnic sub-nationalism perspective from the others is its 
view on the ethnic group' s internal dynamics. Specifically, this perspective argues that ethnic 
mobilization begins with the resolve of the minority upper strata. As well, the success of such 
movements is contingent upon the ability of this strata to secure the support of the minority 
lower strata in opposing the dominant upper strata and/ or national elites. 22 As such support is 
based upon both the existence and strength of organizational ties, social cohesion demands that 
such ties have relevance and exclusivity for group members.23 Ethnic identity becomes relevant 
where it provides a clear function for its members and exclusive when group membership 
becomes the definitive base for members' political actions. In addition to the logic of 
segmentary oppositions outlined earlier, other elements unite upper and lower indigenous strata, 
thus enhancing the prospects of achieving social cohesion. For instance, many urban natives, 
including members of the native elite, still have relatives and friends in rural areas and hold their 
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life on the land within memory. Whether rural or urban, upper or lower strata, all natives relied 
on virtually the same institutions (i.e. specific state agencies) throughout the Soviet era. 
I 
Group organization also contributes to social cohesion. While the ethnic competition 
' 
model views ethno-political organization as a product of ethnic competition, the former tenet 
rings true in the ethnic sub-nationalism model only if the minority upper strata perceives it to be 
an attractive option for furthering their goals. It is the means by which the upper strata may win 
over the lower strata and, in doing so, defuse the class conflict which prevents native peoples 
from gaining concessions from the state. 24 This seems to be the case in Y akutia to some extent, 
occurring at all levels-- local, raion, republican, and nationwide. Achieving support of the lower 
for the upper strata requires grassroots input and participation, which may bolster solidarity at 
the micro level and is necessary to fulfill the mandate of nationwide and regional indigenous 
associations. Indigenous mobilization has also been relatively successful in Yakutia due to the 
low level of class conflict within its aboriginal population. 25 
Ethnic mobilization in this model typically occurs in the face of external pressure of 
some sort. This has been the case throughout Russia, with indigenes often fearing for the very 
survival of their cultures. This country has undergone both major economic structuring and 
implemented "majority rule" approaches to politics within the past decade. These and other 
changes restructured political roles, rewards, and benefits among ethnic groups, thus 
encouraging competition. Most recently, other effects spawned of modernization, integration, 
and regime transition have brought about state policies that disadvantage native minorities in 
• 
some way (i.e. by diminishing special privileges, sanctioning individual instead of communal 
rights), while simultaneously promoting social stratification among indigenous populations. 
The relative value of political resources26 depends upon the situation, varying according 
to resource availability, the nature of the political system (i.e. authoritarian, democratic), the 
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state's will to permit or accommodate ethnic claims, the motives of the groups involved, the 
degree of change that may plausibly be achieved, and the legal basis of group claims against the 
state. Although this last factor significantly enhances indigenous mobilizational capacities, it 
goes virtually unmentioned in the literature on ethnic mobilization. As such, existing scholarly 
approaches fail to consider the full range of political resources available to ethnic groups. 
The key political resource differentiating natives is the legal basis of their claims against 
the state-- this is, their status as aboriginal peoples. The state has responded to aboriginal claims 
differently than to those advanced by other ethnic groups. The reactive ethnicity hypothesis that 
mobilization occurs primarily as a backlash to past grievances must be discarded in light of the 
legal basis upon which aboriginal claims are founded. Self-government legislation was achieved 
by Yakutia's natives on this basis, as was recognition in the constitutions of both this republic 
and of the Russian Federation. It is unlikely that lower-level administrative units will grant 
native groups special privileges on this basis unless pending federal legislation on the status of 
indigenous peoples obliges regional governments to do so. Such legislation is necessary, for as 
the situation currently stands, policies based on equality do not necessarily ensure equity for 
aboriginal peoples in terms of their legal rights and self-determined opportunities. 27 
Aboriginal peoples are typically not in search of "power" as it is understood in many 
political works.28 Rather, writes Patrick Macklem, "[t]he drive for self-government, the Native 
equivalent of an ethnonationalist impulse, is an attempt to seize control from non-Native 
authorities over the process by which aboriginal identities are constructed. "29 It is control over 
one's lives and ethnic boundaries that is sought, but as power may not be necessary to secure 
such rights, it is instead influence that aboriginal groups seek. Typically, the ethnic mobilization 
literature has placed too much emphasis on power-based relationships to the exclusion of those 
pursued within indigenous mobilization. Because native peoples do not aim to disrupt or 
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separate from the center, they tend to adopt within-system approaches such as devolution and 
self-governing arrangements. By not seriously threatening the political center, various 
indigenous groups managed to create a niche for themselves withjn existing political institutions 
which allowed them to acquire various state concessions. Indigenous mobilizational strategies 
may even be viewed as "conflict/ resolution processes within the ethnonationalist tradition".
30 
Indigenous mobilization is also bolstered by similarities of traditional native and "post-
industrial" values in terms of their coexistence with nature, general rejection of materialism, and 
common desire to maintain a resource-modest way of life. 31 These strategies typically 
emphasize quality of life, rather than purely economic, interests. Such deeply-held convictions 
help to explain not only why ethnic groups sometimes promote interests that may actually reduce 
their chances of attaining prosperity and political power32 but also why, even in the face of 
numerous obstructions, those with the strongest ties to the land are the most likely to struggle for 
its protection and viability as a life-sustaining resource. These trends refute the normal rubric of 
power-based theories typical of the reactive ethnicity and ethnic competition models. 
As the ethnic sub-nationalism and competition models stress the same causal inferences 
and as several facets of the developmental model also help to explain indigenous mobilization, 
the ethrnc sub-nationalism model can be extended by subsuming aspects of each of these 
models. By comparing the different models, Table 5.1 highlights the degree of accord between 
the ideas of each and those of the extended ethnic sub-nationalism model, qualifying to what 
extent each is applicable. The purpose of this chart is to distinguish between the facets of other 
models which accord with, and those that broaden, the ethnic sub-nationalism model. Those 
areas that accord with this extended model broaden its application. Here, the extended model 
adopts the ethnic competition tenet that mobilization may occur both among groups that are and 
are not relatively wealthy. So too does it appropriate the developmental and reactive ethnicity 
Table 5.1 Applicability of Ethnic Mobilization Theories in Light of the Case Study 
Geographically 
Peripheral 
Relotive Social 
Isolation 
Developmental 
Historical residue 
Yes 
Strong Linguistic Yes 
Base 
Regional Economic 
Growth 
of Ethnic Group 
Ethnic Members in 
Industrial Economic 
Activities 
Class & Ethnic 
Territorially 
Concentrated 
Reactive Ethnicity 
roles and resources 
to dominant 
nationalities 
Yes 
Not applicable 
Limited applicability 
Strongly applicable 
Unclear 
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1 The degree of social isolation (or segregation) is largely conditioned by the availability o£: and access to, systems of 
communication (i.e. postal service, telephones, fax, popular media, etc.) and transportation (i.e. travel outside by 
locals, visits by tourists, delivery of supplies). 
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notion that a group' s size is of lesser importance to the success of ethnic mobilization than 
originally thought, especially given the forms of mobilization pursued by indigenous peoples. 
These two cases clarify those aspects of the ethnic sub-nationalism model which are obscure. 
The extended ethnic sub-nationalism model absorbs from the other models certain ideas 
which elaborate on the case study. The areas where the developmental model broadens the 
ethnic sub-nationalism model concern not cause of, but the factors contributing to, mobilization. 
In this model, mobilization is more likely among groups that are somewhat socially isolated or 
segregated. Though the likelihood of ethnic movements may not actually be greater under such 
conditions, the case study demonstrates that mobilization can still occur among relatively 
socially isolated groups. Here, access to transportation and communication systems have been 
critical in the success of mobilization. Because a group' s wealth is unimportant to the initiation, 
but not the success, of mobilization in the ethnic competition model, the developmental and 
reactive ethnicity models contribute to the extended ethnic sub-nationalism model in that even 
groups considered to be relatively poor may mobilize successfully. 
The extended ethnic sub-nationalism model incorporates the ethnic competition view on 
causation. Since each model emphasizes structural change of a different sort and as neither 
accounts for both the initiation and success of mobilization, the extended model adopts a 
combination of the two. In the extended model: ( 1) the minority upper strata initiate ethnic 
mobilization, (2) such a movement is hindered by class-based cleavages within the ethnic group, 
and (3) it is necessary to overcome these class divisions if ethnic mobilization is to be successful. 
As class divisions limit social cohesion, class and ethnic interests cannot be seen as one and the 
same. Indigenous mobilization within Russia results from both class and status factors; it cannot 
be explained simply by one or the other. 
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Contributions to the Study of Etbno-Political Mobilization 
The contributions of this thesis have been both theoretical and substantive. This paper has 
approached the case study with the notion that while theory explains reality, reality must also 
inform theory. ·It has illustrated the case study, contrasted its realities with existing theory and 
used this case in building upon the existing body of theory. It has sought to uncover trends 
which support existing theoretical tenets, to interpret points of analysis which had not yet been 
clarified, and to reveal discrepancies with generally accepted socio-political patterns. 
Soviet nationalities policy not only directly influenced indigenous mobilization by 
simultaneously promoting segregationist and assimilationist measures, but did so indirectly via 
various state-building processes and other macro-social developments. This study not only 
offers a commentary on the diverse outcomes of Soviet nationalities policy for aboriginal groups 
and the prospects for their ethnic mobilization, it has endeavored to demonstrate how various 
macro-processes have affected developments at the micro-level in ways which promoted 
indigenous mobilization within Russia. It has outlined the external and internal influences that 
affect such mobilization, detailing the unique features of the case illustrated and showing how 
these particularities have affected the general unfolding of ethno-political processes therein. 
As broad themes and orienting questions serve to differentiate case studies, it ts 
noteworthy that scholarly works on ethnic mobilization have typically asked different questions 
and pursued different themes than the ethnic sub-nationalism model. Rather than limiting this 
model's application, its potential to investigate different ethnic groups and to uncover different 
explanatory variables has grown compared to other models (refer to Table 3.1). The ethnic sub-
nationalism model may be useful in explaining alternative forms of ethnic mobilization. 
Ethnic aspirations are situational and variable, manifesting themselves differently 
according to regional and cultural contexts. Considering the numerous ways in which ethnic 
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mobilization may manifest itself, it is surprising that the literature deals almost exclusively with 
full-fledged ethno-nationalist movements. Students of ethnicity tend to focus on a limited set of 
actions aimed at disrupting the center (i.e. ethnic demonstrations, political violence, formation of 
ethnic political' parties, and representation in national or regional legislative bodies). 
Membership and participation in ethnic organizations, in contrast, receive significantly lesser 
scholarly attention. As this is the form in which indigenous mobilization manifests itself in 
Yakutia, this case study provides a basis for further investigation on ethnic mobilization. 
While existing scholarship on ethnicity and ethnic mobilization concerns groups 
spanning each of the First, Second, and Third Worlds, its major shortcoming lies in its failure to 
address other, non-state peoples who are scattered throughout these regions and to which 
significantly less attention has been paid-- the indigenous peoples of the Fourth World. As such, 
the literature fails to include the full range of nationalities who have successfully mobilized. 
This study has endeavored to widen the scope of study to their inclusion. Scholars tend to 
associate the desire to secure some measure of autonomy over ethnic territories with 
nationalism; . however, "pre-nations" such as indigenous peoples also exhibit this desire and 
mobilize politically towards this end. 33 While indigenous ethnic mobilization shares 
commonalities with other ethnic groups, the distinctiveness of their approach to ethnic 
mobilization renders them especially deserving of study. 
Like the other models, the ethnic sub-nationalism model falls short of explaining both 
why and how ethnic mobilization occurs; an extension of this model moves us closer to this end. 
A comprehensive analysis demands an understanding of not only why ethnic mobilization occurs 
but also why, in other cases, it does not. Such a feat would entail an exploration of the forces 
that promote or downplay the politicization of ethnicity or the even demobilization of ethnicity 
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altogether. While not comprehensive, this study suggests several reasons for why ethnic 
mobilization does and does not occur. The next few paragraphs address these reasons. 
Mobilization occurs mainly because structural arrangements and state policies promote 
it. Throughout' the Soviet era, state policy highlighted cultural diversity, institutionalized ethnic 
differences, and fostered indigenous capacities. In tum, these developments politicized ethnicity 
and permitted their impending ethnic mobilization. Towards the end of the Soviet era, glasnost' 
gave groups the opportunity to mobilize along ethnic lines. Using the ethnic sub-nationalism 
model, we can identify several reasons why indigenous mobilization occurred. First, after the 
repression of the Soviet era, the state' s recognition of ethnic groups as legitimate political 
contenders created a domino effect of groups mobilizing and an increased level of ethnic 
competition. With many new political actors, mobilization seemed the only way for natives to 
protect group interests. Second, there were new external threats to native cultures, lands, and 
resources. The protection of these components of indigenous life necessitated mobilization. 
Third, ethnic mobilization seemed attractive among the native elite in order to promote their 
interests. If they could secure the support from the indigenous lower strata, the resultant social 
cohesion could be used in opposition to the majority dominant strata or state. Ethnic 
mobilization is perhaps the most potent way to reformulate indigenous boundaries. Ethnic 
identity can be seen both as an antecedent and an outcome of processes such as mobilization and 
debunks the myth that groups first develop identities and only later realize the instrumental 
component of ethnicity. Political organization itself is an embodiment of the message. 
A comprehensive explanation of why mobilization does not occur is not possible at this 
time since studies have not examined the ethnic groups which failed to mobilize. 34 Yet, this 
study does suggest several reasons for this. First, as it is the state which demarcates the 
boundaries upon which political mobilization may occur, the most obvious explanation for the 
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failure to mobilize is that political structural arrangements did not permit it. Subordinated and 
oppressed minorities were unable to mobilize prior to the Gorbachev era because the necessary 
conditions for ethnic mobilization were not met. Second, by the time the political and structural 
conditions were met, many smaller native groups had already been assimilated into other groups. 
Third, and in specific reference to the situation in which natives found themselves in Russia 
several decades ago, the degree of ethnic consolidation within the group may still have been too 
low for mobilization. As realpolitik predominates in modem states, groups must consider what 
is achievable through ethnic mobilization. This is contingent upon the removal of existing 
situational constraints upon identities, including both those imposed "from above" and those that 
occur within groups. Though an exhaustive explanation of why some ethnic groups do not 
mobilize is beyond the scope of this thesis, a fuller understanding requires their testing. 
Ethnic movements are not just cultural incidents but struggles for institutional change. 
Indeed, native groups engage in politics and competes for scarce resources not only with other 
actors and social movements, but with traditional political institutions. 35 This study has 
contributed to the ethnic mobilization literature in still other ways: by providing a fuller 
explanation of the diversity of the origins of ethnic mobilization; by broadening the definition of 
what can be included as a political resource; and by providing an example of a group whose 
mobilization did not rest on affluence and prosperity, thus refuting such a causal inference. 
All but the ethnic sub-nationalism model pay little attention to processes which promote 
identity formation and social cohesion and, by extension, contribute to ethnic mobilization as it 
occurs among native groups. Other models tend to blur the division between leaders and the led 
which still prevails within ethnic movements. As many theorists tend to define political actors 
solely by their strategies, this thesis has broadened this definition to also consider their social 
relationships with group members, with other political contenders, and with the national elite. 
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The first three perspectives tend to emphasize either discontinuity or continuity at the 
expense of realizing that both exist. In the case study, there is discontinuity with respect to some 
levels of indigenous socio-political organization (i.e. national organizations), the forms and 
availability of Political resources used in mobilization (both direct and mobilizational resources), 
and the transition from a political environment of exclusion and repression to one of inclusion 
within the national polity. These latter two areas of discontinuity have not been sufficiently 
addressed within the ethnic mobilization literature. On the other hand, there is continuity in the 
values being promoted and bases of social organization. This thesis rejects the proposition that 
ethnic movements always represent new values for, although distinctive from new social 
movements, traditional aboriginal values have long been concerned with such issues as cultural 
reproduction, social integration, and socialization. These issues still guide native peoples as they 
realize their own identities and to demarcate their own boundaries. 
Although policy persuasions often infect the agenda of state-funded research, there is 
much call for the concrete application of research in state policy. Studies must avoid the high 
level of abstraction typical of many social science works on ethnic conflict and mobilization. 
Studies also need to contribute to our understanding of regional variation through regionally- and 
culturally-specific studies. This study has sought to achieve these goals. Policy-makers, in turn, 
need to employ such studies so as to prevent the uniform application of state programs among 
diversified ethnic populations, diversity which nationalities policy had a large part in creating. 
Possibilities for Further Investigation 
Since theories on ethnic mobilization emphasize polity-level phenomena, filling the existing 
gaps in this area of inquiry requires that studies go beyond the interface between theory and 
individual case studies to also examine differences across a broad range of cases. While J.S. 
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Mill's method of agreement could be used to identify correlates between cases and theory, his 
method of difference could address the specifics of each, potentially accounting for theoretical 
misfits by contextualizing cases in accordance with the historical and political evidence. Such 
an approach may fill in yet other gaps in the literature by considering not only instances of ethnic 
mobilization, but also non-instances. This would contribute to an understanding of not only why 
ethnic mobilization occurs in some cases, but also why, in others, it does not. Using the 
approach outlined above may help to reveal the social and political forces that downplay the 
politicization or demobilization of ethnicity as a binding force. This would be an important 
contribution to this area of scholarly inquiry, for what does not occur can often be just as 
important as what does. 
While the reactive ethnicity and ethnic competition perspectives may apply to many First 
World instances of ethnic mobilization, a combination of various aspects of the developmental 
and ethnic competition models help extend the ethnic sub-nationalism model and may best 
explain Fourth World ethnic movements. Cross-cultural studies are required to test such 
possibilities, among which it may be useful to include a range of indigenous peoples who have 
been incorporated into each of the First, Second, and Third Worlds. Collaborative, comparative 
studies between scholars of such diverse regions would also be useful . A similar strategy, were 
it to involve natives of the regions studied, would be useful in Yakutia and various other 
northern regions since they can learn from one another and because those residing in Yakutia are 
at a similar stage to that undergone several decades ago in Canada. Although an attempt to fill 
the gaps here outlined is beyond the scope of this paper, these limitations still need be 
recognized. 
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CONCLUSION 
Comprehending the historic roots of the current struggle towards greater aboriginal self-
determination is important if understanding is to be achieved between the dominant majority and 
native minorities. The traditional view generally equates struggles for self-determination with 
nationalist and often even separatist movements. This view is defective since it is pan-
indigenism, rather than full-fledged nationalism, that has emerged among these non-state 
peoples. Ethnic assertiveness is couched within several overlapping levels of ethnic identity, of 
which pan-indigenism is the most complex, and typically pursues "within-system" approaches. 
A central argument of this thesis is that modem state-building processes, coupled with 
state policy, not only set the stage for indigenous ethnic mobilization but played an integral part 
in shaping the form and strategy pursued. Soviet nationalities policy both forged the chassis of 
indigenous mobilization and molded the cast by which it ensued within Russia. While this 
policy area proved the state to be Janus-faced in its simultaneous promotion of segregationist 
policies (i.e. native territorial-administrative units) and assimilationist measures (i.e. residential 
schools), it also equipped natives with the means by which to mount their political struggle. 
Essentially, state policy transformed natives from non-competitive peoples to peoples who were 
engaged, and many who were even successful, in the competition for scarce political resources. 
It is ironic that in the riddle of Soviet nationalities policy itself lay the very key to its solution. 
One of the key problems this work identified is that the study of aboriginal development 
is limited by the tendency of ethnicity-related studies to over-generalize and to pay insufficient 
attention to the socio-cultural basis of the current indigenous struggle. While these analyses 
have succeeded in identifying general ethnicity-related issues and their antecedents, they have 
failed, with few exceptions, to apply these same principles according to the regional and cultural 
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context of native peoples. Through an historical analysis employing the ethnic mobilization 
perspective, this study advances two key arguments. First, the key cause of indigenous 
mobilization is neither the particularistic allocation of valued roles and resources to dominant 
nationalities nor an "historical residue" of nationalism reactivated in a modem context. Rather, 
it is structural change. The state defines the political space in which ethnic mobilization occurs 
and aboriginal claims are made. Claims were not permitted during the Soviet era until structural 
change under Gorbachev granted the opportunity necessary for ethnic mobilization. 
The second argument is that the variables responsible for the initiation of ethnic 
mobilization may not be the same as those responsible for the success of ethnic movements. 
Structural change that reorganizes competition between ethnic groups for political resources is 
responsible for the initiation of such movements, while success hinges on yet a different 
outcome of structural change-- the generation of opposition to the political center which extends 
across the different classes that comprise the ethnic group. Employing the Salcha Republic as 
our case study and contrasting developments in this republic and Russia's other lower-level 
territorial administrative units, this thesis has identified several key variables which contribute to 
the initiation and success of indigenous ethnic mobilization which have gone virtually 
unmentioned in the literature on ethnic mobilization. At the same time, other variables generally 
held as necessary for ethnic mobilization have played no part in this case. 
This work suggests that the ethnic sub-nationalism model is useful in explaining the 
differing variables and outcomes of ethnic mobilization. In particular, it best explains how state 
policies have set the stage for this impending mobilization. As well, this perspective holds the 
promise of expanding upon the scholarship on ethno-political mobilization to include Fourth 
World (non-state) peoples since the lessons from the First-, Second-, and Third-World instances 
of ethnic mobilization may or may not be applicable to indigenous peoples. 
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Natives living in modem states face a dilemma over the ends to which cultural 
differences are put. While their unique cultural features justified their cultural marginalization 
during the Soviet era, their situation changed under Gorbachev with their mobilization and the 
institutionalization of arrangements through which they may both reformulate indigenous 
identities and delineate ethnic boundaries on their own terms. We should be warned, however, 
that for each case upon which the larger body of theory draws, including that of this study, there 
are very real constraints upon both the political strategies adopted in ethnic movements and the 
degree of success ethnic groups may achieve. However, so too are there opportunities. 
Should the state help it will appear to be rescuing its natives, but it will be "rescuing" 
them from a crisis that the state played no small part in creating. The problems Russia's 
natives face will not be solved by simply leaving them alone~ on the contrary, the solution 
requires some degree of intervention by the state so as to level out patterns of aboriginal 
development throughout Russia. This should take several forms-- the continuation of subsidies 
for food and transportation~ investment in regional development~ and the introduction, 
monitoring, and enforcement of legislation on the status of indigenous peoples. Such legislation 
should recognize aboriginal identities for what they are, bound not by externally-imposed 
ascriptive criteria but by their own ethnic boundaries and definitions of aboriginality, a legal 
status which is inalienable whether engaged in traditional or modem industries, whether able or 
unable to speak their native language, whether urban or rural, and whether old or young. Such 
legislation, however, would only be beneficial if it were to go beyond mere economic criteria to 
also include cultural considerations encouraging the perpetuation of indigenous identities. These 
recommendations are directed not only at the government of the Russian Federation, but at the 
government of the Sakha Republic as well. Indeed, this may very well lay the cornerstone for 
the cultural pluralism that the forefathers of the Soviet Union had allegedly intended to achieve. 
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